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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that historical memory plays a crucial role in the politics of nationbuilding and cultural control, using the context of Czechoslovakia under communism.
Combining theoretical approaches drawn from the study of nationalism and memory
politics, this thesis examines the power dynamics of glorifying or erasing certain
moments in a nation’s past and considers the extent to which history, or a memory of it,
defines the national identity. By analyzing the changes in commemoration as
Czechoslovakia transitioned into a communist system, the malleability of the past
becomes clear, as does the impact of the past upon the present and future. Rhetoric and
commemoration of different formative moments of the Czech past demonstrate how the
Czechoslovak communist government used historical memory as a political tool to build
and rebuild the Czech national identity.
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INTRODUCTION
It is no secret of history that communist regimes across the Eastern Bloc were masters in
controlling their realities. They held the art, the literature, the very culture of their home
nations as tightly regulated as the economies or government institutions. National history
and memory naturally fell under these politics of control; these governments forcefully
abandoned histories that did not align with the communist version of reality and created
others. Politicians and officials molded and manipulated the past, commemorating or
forgetting history to shape an alternate narrative that aligned with communist ideology
and values.
An anecdote of two unfinished monuments occupying the same square in Brno,
Czechoslovakia, in the 1950s exemplifies the complex relationship between history and
political control under Eastern European communism.1 As recorded by a Radio Free
Europe report, both were only pedestals, one dedicated to first Czechoslovak president,
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, and the other, much bigger and more elaborate, to the victories
of the Soviet Army during the Second World War.2 Still in the initial stages of
1

The name of the region now known as Czechia and Slovakia has changed over time and the term will thus
reflect the historical context. Prior to 1918, it was not an official state, and known as the Czech or
Bohemian Lands. From 1918 to 1993, the country’s title was Czechoslovakia. In 1993, the nation split into
the Czech Republic and Slovakia; in 2016, the Czech Republic made Czechia its official name.
2
Radio Free Europe is a U.S.-sponsored radio station created in 1940 to broadcast both domestic and
international news to Eastern Bloc states, on the premise that news in Soviet-controlled states was pure
propaganda. It should be noted that RFE, as an anti-communist organization run by the U.S. government
with Eastern European emigrants as their main source informants, had its own Western bias. However, in
dealing with the politics of historical memory, bias is just as important as objective information, provided it
is acknowledged. Using RFE reports, specifically those created in collaboration with Czech emigrants, can
provide a different side to the systems of rewriting history and reality, one performed by the West and
Czech citizens instead of the communist government. See Melissa Feinberg, "Fantastic Truths, Compelling
Lies: Radio Free Europe and the Response to the Slánský Trial in Czechoslovakia," Contemporary
European History 22, no. 1 (2013): 107-25.
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implementing communism on a cultural level, the Czech Communist Party, or the KSČ,
rejected the Masaryk pedestal as a symbol of popular sovereignty and communist
opposition, while the citizens of Brno mocked the communist pedestal for its un-Czech
values.3 “A wonderful drama had begun to evolve around the two unfinished statues, the
big one and the little one, each in its way symbolic of the two opposing camps,” the
report stated.4 On state-mandated holidays, the regime decorated the communist pedestal
with red flags; on Czechoslovak Independence Day and on Masaryk’s birthday, the
Czech public assembled around the Masaryk pedestal, leaving flowers and anticommunist posters.5 The KSČ took action, ordering street cars not to stop in the square
on those days, making arrests, and even spraying the crowd with fire hoses. When this
proved ineffective, the KSČ planted a flower bed around the Masaryk pedestal,
preventing the crowd from paying its respects, but honoring Masaryk in the process. In
some ways, this was a hypocritical act of surrender, in others it was an act to regain
power over memory. The Czechoslovak nation was not to forget Masaryk, but his
commemoration was to be on the communist government’s terms.
In Czechoslovakia, the communist government built an altered version of history
upon a framework of memory and symbols that Czech society and governments had
developed in the past. When the communist party rose to power in 1948, they utilized the
3

The full Czech name of the Communist Party is Komunistická strana Československa (KSČ).
"The Story of Two Monuments: Brno Opts for Masaryk, Snubs Red Army." 23 March 1953. HU OSA
300-1-2-32400; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: General Records:
Information Items; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. Electronic Record.
5
As will be explained in Chapter III, during the communist era, Independence Day was celebrated on 5
May in honor of the end of World War II, but the Independence Day recognized in this story is October
twenty eighth, the date Czechoslovakia was first established as a nation after World War I. 28 October was
Independence Day prior to the communist era, as will be discussed in Chapter III. Celebrating 28 October
was a sign of resistance because it referenced an era of popular sovereignty that contradicted the
communist political agenda.
4

4

pre-existing historical memory and mythology for political gain. As the government’s
political agendas and levels of oppression changed over time, they approached cultural
control differently. However, de-emphasizing non-communist values while still using the
power of formative moments in Czech history as a way to legitimize politics was a theme
throughout the era. They took existing myths of iconic Czech national figures or events
and blended them with newer communist ideals to demonstrate their validity as leaders.
The fixation on rewriting history demonstrates the power of the past in the Czech national
identity, particularly during periods of nation-building. Historical memory and how it
evolved, specifically in Czechoslovakia’s early stages of communism, demonstrates not
only its importance in forming a national identity, but its role when a government seeks
to control the national identity.
Certain moments have been more formative in Czech history and are
consequently more powerful in the historical memory and national identity. These
moments are visible in pre-communist era commemorations, but more importantly, were
targeted by the KSČ when they attempted to control the Czech population through their
treatment of history. This thesis will address three of most discussed and visibly
commemorated moments in Czech history. Chapter I discusses the Bohemian
Reformation, a medieval religious and military movement in the early fifteenth century,
during which Czech religious dissidents rose up against the teachings of the Roman
Catholic Church. The Czech population has repeatedly commemorated the Bohemian
Reformation and its key actors, proving its significance in their historical memory. In
recognition of this significance, the KSČ reworked the era’s symbols and philosophy as

5

communist in their own discourse and remembrance as a way to build support and
legitimacy. Chapter II examines political remembrance and erasure of another formative
moment in Czech memory: the First Czechoslovak Republic, from the end of World War
I to the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. The First Republic is unique in that it was
the first time that the Czech lands became a self-governing nation, at least in the
contemporary sense of the term. Because of this, the era helped define “Czechness” and
built a foundation of the Czech national identity. The First Czechoslovak Republic was in
fact charged with ideals that came to challenge the communist government at its height of
oppression, so the KSČ often approached it with historical erasure, rather than attempts at
commemoration. Chapter III analyzes the communist era itself as a final moment in
Czech history that the communist government targeted through the politics of memory
and commemoration. Political instability characterized the communist era in
Czechoslovakia, and one way the KSČ addressed this issue was through erasure or reremembrance of events, despite the fact that they were still a part of living memory.
By analyzing state-sponsored commemorations and imaginings of these three
eras, this thesis builds upon the theory of historical memory and nation-building and
examines how they function in a communist historical context. Czechoslovakia under
communism experienced what theorist John Hutchinson calls a “mythic overlaying,” or a
renovation and recreation of previously existing mythic structures, for the purpose of
legitimizing a new system to the collective.6 The KSČ’s control of the Czech past is an

6

John Hutchinson, “Nations and Culture,” in Understanding Nationalism, ed. Montserrat Guibernau and
John Hutchinson (Cambridge: Policy Press, 2001), 82.

6

example of the power of historical memory within a national identity, as well as its role
in oppressive power structures.
The inconsistencies between historical reality and the narrative told by the KSČ
are an obvious and acknowledged theme in Eastern European history. This is not what
this thesis intends to address. Instead, I argue the KSČ’s decision to either appropriate or
erase certain Czech historical memories was a way to legitimize their often-oppressive
politics, demonstrating how historical memory plays a key role in shaping a national
identity. Historical memory and symbols can be political tools, with the potential to
undermine or support an institution. In the case of communist Czechoslovakia, the KSČ
manipulated systems of memory in attempt to “communize” the Czech identity, affirming
the significance of the past in controlling the present. By examining how the government
re-remembered and erased history, the relationship between historical memory, national
identity, and political power structures becomes clear.
The Politics of Historical Memory and Nation-Building
Maurice Halbwachs, the foundational scholar in the theory of collective memory, once
described history as “a crowded cemetery, where room must constantly be made for new
tombstones.”7 In this “crowded cemetery,” every society, culture, or nation must make
the conscious or unconscious decision which metaphorical tombstones will remain, and
which they will allow to disintegrate, beginning the process of collective forgetting.
Within the collective forgetting or remembering lies the concept of historical memory:
the subjective changeability of memory applied to the fixed construction of history. It is
7

Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 52.
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neither a precise historical record nor an individual memory, but the two interacting
within a group consciousness.8 In the context of nation-building, such as during
Czechoslovakia’s First Republic, memory becomes a vital part of creating a national
identity. In other situations, such as during Czechoslovakia’s communist era, it becomes
a method of controlling the group. Due to its collective nature, historical memory builds a
sense of unified identity, making it a powerful aspect of cultural and political history.
Halbwachs contended that historical memory strengthens remembrance for each
individual within the group, writing, “I can still feel the group’s influence and recognize
in myself many ideas and ways of thinking that could not have originated with me and
that keep me in contact with it.”9 This group construction simultaneously comes from
above and below: individuals in power have control over establishing an official memory,
while popular cultural narratives arise from the common population. This basic
phenomenon goes beyond the shared experience; a group’s collective memory,
particularly in the context of a nation, can contain memories that were experienced by
generations earlier but remain an essential part of the group’s identity.10 When a
historical event is so influential to the group’s sense of identity, it will become embedded
in the collective memory, thus “remembered” even by those who did not directly
experience it or were not even alive at the time. The memory has become stored and
8

The theory surrounding historical memory grew from an early twentieth century combination of sociology
and history examining the relationship between bonded groups of individuals and the past. Similar terms
include “collective memory” or “social memory,” depending on the scholar. Maurice Halbwachs is widely
acknowledged as the founder of the topic, but other influential scholars in the discipline include James E.
Young, Jan Assman, Jeffrey Andrew Barash, James W. Pennebaker, and Pierre Nora, who will be another
key theorist in this thesis. These scholars use a variety of approaches to the discipline of Memory Studies,
from sociology to psychology to history, which influence their analysis of the theory.
9
Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, 25.
10
Aleida Assmann, “Transformations between History and Memory,” Social Research: An International
Quarterly 75, no. 1 (2008): 50.

8

interpreted by the group as an institution. For instance, many Czechs “remember” the
1989 Velvet Revolution, during which power was transferred from the KSČ to a
parliamentary republic. Even for Czechs born after the fact or those too young to
remember, it has become a part of nation’s historical memory passed down to the
younger generation as a symbol of freedom and resistance.11
Historical memory is especially potent on a national level.12 It is a key part of
forming national identity by defining the group’s sense of self. Drawing upon shared
history and interpretations builds a group identity; thus, harnessing historical memory is a
powerful way to create or strengthen a national identity. As Benedict Anderson argues in
Imagined Communities, creating nations is “the spontaneous distillation of a complex
‘crossing’ of discrete historical forces; but that, once created, they became ‘modular,’
capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great
variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of
political and ideological constellations.”13 Anderson discusses how history, in the context
of nation-building and nationalism, becomes a flexible force that is embedded in the
culture and politics of the developing state.14

11

For more information on the Velvet Revolution, see James Krapfl, Revolution with a Human Face:
Politics, Culture, and Community in Czechoslovakia, 1989–1992 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).
12
The terms “nation,” “state,” and “nation-state” are often used differently and occasionally
interchangeably depending on the theorist. Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation as, “an imagined
political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” is appropriate for this thesis.
The idea of Czechoslovakia was a political construction that changed throughout the twentieth century but
remained “limited and sovereign” in terms of borders and having its own domestic government - even
when the Soviet Union influenced said government. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983), 6.
13
Anderson, Imagined Communities, 4.
14
Over the past century, nationalism has become an area of study in its own right. Some of the most
influential theorists, particularly who pertain to this thesis, are Benedict Anderson, Ernest Renan, John

9

It is difficult to discuss nation-building without considering nationalism; and
nationalism, as an instrument for unifying a nation, is closely aligned with historical
memory. Anthony Smith defines nationalism as “an ideological movement for attaining
and maintaining identity, unity, and autonomy of a social group some of whose members
deem it to constitute an actual or potential nation.”15 In the context of memory theory,
one should consider the role of the past in “attaining and maintaining identity.”
According to Halbwachs, memory bonds a group of people with a shared history;
historical memory thus acts as a component of the “ideological movement” that
constructs a nation. Nationalism, like historical memory, creates a “mythic overlaying” to
unify the collective; history and memory act as a key part of this national mythology.16
Historical memory, particularly within the nation, is visible through a group’s
system of tradition and commemoration, as described by French historian Pierre Nora’s
idea of lieux de mémoire, or “realms of memory,” which are the “symbolic element[s] of
the memorial heritage of any community.”17 As Nora explains, “Lieux de mémoire are
complex things. At once natural and artificial, simple and ambiguous, concrete and
abstract, they are lieux––places, sites, causes––in three senses: material, symbolic, and
functional.”18 Whether physical or more abstract, lieux de mémoire emerge as a result of
a group’s collective historical remembrance; “natural” because historical memory is in
Hutchinson, Anthony Smith, Rogers Brubaker, Steve Stern, John Armstrong, Ernest Gellner, Eric
Hobsbawm, and Aviel Roshwald.
15
Anthony Smith, “Ethno-Symbolism and the Study of Nationalism,” in Nations and Nationalism: A
Reader eds. Philip Spencer, Howard Wollman (Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 30.
16
Hutchinson, “Nations and Culture,” 82.
17
Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), xvii. Lieux de mémoire translates to “sites of memory” or “realms
of memory,” but Nora explains that the English translation neglects “historical, intellectual, emotional, and
largely unconscious” connotations.
18
Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, 14.
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many ways an inevitable phenomenon and “artificial” because a society constructs its
memory based on an altered, mythological version of history. Nora, with French
collective memory as his case study, uses monuments, museums, flags, and more
intangible symbols such as a beloved national figure, or a holiday as examples of lieux de
mémoire. To build a monument, for instance, is to put not only visibility, but permanence
and physicality to a historical symbol. A figure memorialized in granite or an annual
parade signals its importance to the creators and rememberers and even the unaware
viewer knows that the figure is an important part of history (or at least perceived as such).
Regardless of what the figure actually accomplished, he or she has been designated a
symbol of the culture, creating a lieu de mémoire.
Combining the theory of historical memory, nation-building, and lieux de
mémoire reveals the extent to which a nation’s past is wrapped in the politics of identity
and control. This relationship is clear in communist Czechoslovakia, and any
governments. Drawing upon shared history and interpretations can ignite a sense of
national unity; thus, harnessing historical memory and lieux de mémoire is a powerful
way to strengthen and define a national identity. However, it can be difficult to reconcile
the idea of a nation or nationalism in the context of a communist society. Communism
and nationalism are two concepts that have a complex and contradiction-laden
relationship.19 One reason for the difficulties in analyzing the connection between

19

According to Marx and Engels, communism is a political and economic ideal where capitalism should be
overthrown to create a classless, property-less, society. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The
Communist Manifesto,” Marx/Engels Selected Works 1 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1969), 98-137; Karl
Marx and Friedrich Engels, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 2015).
Marx and Engels’s theories were re-interpreted many times and manifested differently in socialist and
communist systems across the globe.

11

communism and the nation is simply that Marx and Engels often left gaps in their theory
when it came to the role of the nation. However, Marx once wrote that,
The unity of the nation was not to be destroyed, but, on the contrary, to be
organized by the communal constitution. The unity of the nation was to
become a reality by means of the destruction of the state power which
claimed to be the embodiment of that unity but wanted to be independent
of, and superior to, the nation. In fact this state power was only a parasitic
excrescence on the body of the nation.20
Marx was therefore not opposed to the idea of a nation, so much as the capitalist state
power that controlled it. Yet, communism as an international movement was a vital part
of the manifesto.21 Theorist Regís Debray called the nation, “the atomic nucleus in a
general conflagration of Marxism as a theory and socialism as a practice,” pointing out
the power of the nation and nationalism, as well as its potential for transforming or
dismantling the communist system.22 However, Marx’s original thoughts on nationalism
became somewhat irrelevant once put into practice, as was the case with many aspects of
the communist ideology.
Smith wrote that, “Nationalism signifies the awakening of the nation and its
members to its true collective ‘self’, so that it, and they, obey only the ‘inner voice’ of the
purified community.”23 This idea of authenticity, particularly through national symbols,
is where nationalism and communism intersect. When communist regimes rose to power
in Eastern and Central Europe, using nationalist symbolism to gain legitimacy was one
way to more smoothly implement the new political, economic, and cultural systems. In
20

Karl Marx, quoted in V.I. Lenin, The State and the Revolution (London: Penguin, 1992), 46.
Walter Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic
Contradiction? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1999), 26.
22
Régis Debray, “Marxism and the National Question,” New Left Review 105 (September-October, 1977):
30.
23
Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), 77.
21
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this way, communist governments and politicians could portray themselves “as the heirs
to the great traditions of the nation, and the genuine nation culture which reflected the
authentic national community and its shared experience,” in the words of Walter Kemp.24
The communist nation uses history as a way to create an image of a legitimate and natural
construction.
Nation-building is thus inherently tied to historical memory, especially in
conjunction with communist governments. The theory behind historical memory, nationbuilding, and communism creates a foundation upon which to understand how and why
the KSČ used historical symbols as a way to control the Czech identity. I will use these
three concepts, and their relationships to one another, to explain the shifts in
commemoration and political approaches towards Czech history over the twentieth
century. Erasing and memorializing history is inherently tied with the national identity; a
fact of which the KSČ was well aware and would utilize in their political rhetoric and
physical commemoration of key moments in Czech historical memory.
The Bohemian Reformation as a Historical Symbol
Different historical memories were politicized by Czech governments in their quests to
build or alter the national identity—it is this politicization that reveals which eras hold the
strongest symbolic power in historical memory. Based on the framework of Statesponsored memory and commemorations that the KSČ, as well as previous and following
governments, developed, the Bohemian Reformation is one of the most prominent
symbols in Czech historical memory. Different political generations have interpreted it
24

Kemp, Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: A Basic Contradiction?,
13.
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differently, demonstrating the flexibility of historical memory. The communist
government in particular reimagined it to legitimize their politics within the Czech
cultural context, making it an important part of the relationship between Czech
communism and Czech historical memory. The Bohemian Reformation, known in some
texts as the Czech or Hussite Reformation, began with the teachings of Czech preacher
and scholar Jan Hus (1369-1415). Hus became the face of the Bohemian Reformation
when he began preaching against the Roman Catholic Church, which was a controlling
political and religious force in Europe at the time. He was committed to traditional
Catholic teachings, and his most controversial point was his demand that religious leaders
be punished for sin through public legal outlets.25 This rhetoric was threatening to the
politicized Church officials, who burned Hus at the stake on July 6, 1415.26 Hus’s loyal
followers in Prague militarized the issue, calling themselves Hussites and continuing
Hus’s teachings against the force of the Roman Catholic crusaders.27
As Jan Žižka, Hus’s militant successor, led battles against the Roman Catholic
crusaders, the Hussite religion developed into its own distinct church and community.28
The most radical Hussites established a town called Tábor, where they lived austerely and
strictly according to Hus’s principles. Facing attacks by allied crusader forces of the Holy
Roman Empire, the various branches of Hussites engaged in battle until 1439, when
nearly all Hussite forces were obliterated. Two centuries later, in 1620, the Hapsburg
25

Christopher M. Bellitto, Reassessing Reform: A Historical Investigation into Church Renewal
(Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012), 134.
26
Bellitto, Reassessing Reform, 107.
27
Norman Housley, Religious Warfare in Europe, 1400-1536 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3335.
28
Michael Frassetto, The Great Medieval Heretics: Five Centuries of Religious Dissent (New York: Blue
Bridge, 2008), 185-198.

14

Empire banned all non-Catholic services, placing the Hussites into the past once and for
all.29
Lieux de mémoire of the Bohemian Reformation mark the Czech Republic today,
from street names to statues. It has symbolized Czech resistance and freedom in the face
of an oppressor since the Reformation itself; however, as the Czech national identity
grew more defined, these symbols gained power in historical memory. In the First
Czechoslovak Republic, the Bohemian Reformation was an important part of defining
liberty and strength in the newly-created definition of Czechness. Communist politicians
later took advantage of this power by working to implement the Reformation, Hus, Žižka,
and Tábor into their rhetoric and systems of commemoration.
Frameworks of Memory in the First Republic
Although Czechs had existed as a cultural group for centuries, the First Czechoslovak
Republic was their first instance of formal nationhood.30 Thus began a surge of
nationalism as the new state redefined its identity in terms of formal sovereignty and
“Czechness.” During the First Republic, the Czech population remembered historical
moments of pride, which established a nationalistic attitude within the changing Czech
identity. Prominent Czechs throughout history were glorified, forming a framework of
memory that would hold cultural power through the upcoming century. Liberty, both
personal and national, as well as democracy and popularly sovereignty were ruling ideals,
29

After World War I, The Czechoslovak Hussite Church separated from the Catholic Church as a small
sect describing itself as “neo-Hussite.” There is significant enough historical distance between the
establishment of this church and the original Hussites that for the purpose of this thesis, I consider the
Czechoslovak Hussite Church inspired by, but not the same as Jan Hus’s original reformers.
30
The territory that became Czechoslovakia was known as the “Czech Lands,” prior to 1918. The Czech
lands were divided into three regions based on ethnic group: Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia.
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and became historically associated with the era. In the communist era, specifically when
the regime enacted political violence and cultural oppression, the communist party would
view these ideals and the era they were attached to as threats to their version of the Czech
nation, and delegitimize or erase them.
Prior to 1918, Czechoslovakia had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire––a
branch of the Habsburg monarchy, an empire that ruled much of Central and South
Eastern Europe, including the Czech lands, for centuries. With the end of World War I,
however,

Austria-Hungary

broke

into

several

independent

states,

including

Czechoslovakia.31 The period between Czechoslovakia’s establishment and the Nazi
occupation, in 1938, came to be known as the First Czechoslovak Republic. The First
Republic was a functioning democracy, with a president, prime minister, and parliament.
The first president, and widely acknowledged founder, of the nation was Tomáš Garrigue
Masaryk, who played an instrumental role in gaining Czechoslovakia’s statehood through
negotiations with the Western Allies during World War I. Masaryk became a historical
icon due to his role in creating the internationally-recognized nation. As the First
Republic progressed, Czech nationalism bloomed; the need for a formal identity in the
new nation facilitated a sense of Czech pride and exceptionalism. Czech nationalists used
history, or at least a version of it, as a tool to create a unifying national mythology.32 This
set up a framework of national identity and memory that would define what it means to
be Czech for a century to come.
31

Hugh LeCaine Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (Stanford: Hoover University
Press, 2004), 166-172.
32
Nancy Wingfield, Flag Wars and Stone Saints: How the Bohemian Lands Became Czech (New Haven:
Harvard University Press, 2007), 12.

16

It is important when discussing the Czech nation and nationalism to clarify the
difference between Czech, Slovak, and Czechoslovak. The Slovaks are an ethnic group
with many historical ties to the Czechs, but are a culturally, linguistically, and
geographically distinct group. Cultural matters such as historical memory are therefore
specific to the Czechs or the Slovaks. When Czechoslovakia became a nation in 1918,
Czech and Slovak leaders (against the wishes of some Slovak nationalists) agreed to
combine the two groups into a single nation. Masaryk had long viewed Czechs and
Slovaks as “branches of a single nation” and, furthermore, including the Slovaks into the
new state would make them, rather than Germans, the largest ethnic group after the
Czechs.33 Combining the two groups did not go particularly smoothly; the Slovaks would
secede with the help of Nazi Germany and form an independent state between 1939 and
1945.34 Czechoslovakia was thus a political construction, built from two groups with
separate cultural identities. “Czech” nationalism and historical memory refer to one
(cultural) side of the Czechoslovak state.
The historical memory that came out of the First Czechoslovak Republic, which
glorified Czech heroes from centuries prior, as well as more recent leaders, would soon
be reinterpreted and manipulated by the KSČ. Thus, the historical memory of the First
Republic, as well as the phenomena of nation-building and nationalism, is vital to
understand when analyzing the relationship between the communist regime and historical

33

Nadya Nedelsky, Defining the Sovereign Community: The Czech and Slovak Republics (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 67-68. Ethnic Germans made up a large component of the
population, particularly near the Czech-German border, until they were forcibly removed after World War
II; another minority in the area is the Roma, a migrant population that has been historically persecuted, but
still occupies the space with their own distinct culture and memory.
34
Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 216-218.
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narratives. The KSČ’s system of commemoration and forgetting was built on a
framework of memory created during the First Czechoslovak Republic.
The ČSSR and Mythic Overlaying
The Czechoslovak communist era, or ČSSR, was the height of rewriting Czech historical
memory.35 Communist politicians utilized the system of memory and historical symbols
that had largely developed in the First Czechoslovak Republic, commemorating or
erasing historical memories in accordance to their political agendas. The memory politics
of the ČSSR are an excellent example of mythic overlaying, taking a national identity,
historical memory included, and using it to legitimize a new identity. This drove the
KSČ’s politics of remembrance, layering nationalist and communist symbols upon one
another in attempt to control the Czech population.
The ČSSR was established in 1948, when the Czech communist party staged a
coup d’état, with the support of the Soviet Union, and seized control of the government.36
The KSČ had been gaining power in elections since the end of the Second World War,
and became the largest party in the parliament by 1946. However, as the communist party
gained popularity, Soviet Union upped its involvement in Czech politics, making the
KSČ an increasingly controlling force. Power in the parliament was not enough, and the
coup d’état eliminated the multi-party system along with many individual freedoms.
Other political parties were either destroyed or forcibly merged with the KSČ, ultimately
producing a government with full control over the Czech political sphere. The early years
of Czech communism were closely tied to Soviet Stalinism; the Soviet Union was heavily
35
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involved in Czech political affairs and the harsh policy was reminiscent of Stalin’s
reforms in the Soviet Union. These oppressive measures quickly diminished
communism’s earlier popularity among many Czech citizens. When Stalin died in 1953,
communist parties across the Eastern Bloc moved away from Stalinist-style governing,
but Czechoslovakia maintained one of the harsher and more traditional systems. In 1968,
reform-minded Alexander Dubček was elected General Secretary of the ČSSR, and his
liberal policy initiated a period called “The Prague Spring.” However, the Soviet Union
recognized this increase in popular sovereignty as a threat and, on 20 August, invaded
Prague. From 1968 onwards, “normalization,” i.e. a return to the pre-Prague Spring
communist values, was the status quo. It was not until 1989 that revolutions spread across
Central Europe, overthrowing the communist system.37
The early 1950s, in particular, were some of the harshest years of cultural control
in Czechoslovakia. Stalinism, the ideology that ruled the Eastern Bloc at the time, is a
form of communism based on a totalitarian government and the centralization of
economic and political activity. This resulted in brutal policy that often led to shortages
and political violence. Stalinism in Czechoslovakia reached its height with the show
trials, beginning in 1952: fabricated accusations intended to eliminate political opponents
and intimidate the population. Over 250 people were executed by 1954.38 In this political
climate, less than a decade after the KSČ staged the coup d’état, increasingly
authoritarian Czech communist politicians feared historical symbols of personal liberty or
37

For more information on the second half of the communist period, see Gil Eyal, The Origins of
Postcommunist Elites: From Prague Spring to the Breakup of Czechoslovakia (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003).
38
Agnew, The Czechs and the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, 234-242.

19

popular sovereignty, which could undermine their oppressive policy and facilitate
resistance. In the early 1950s, Czech historical memory and how to approach it had high
political stakes.
Communism in Czechoslovakia between 1948 and 1989 cannot be categorized as
a homogenous system. It went through multiple shifts in political and social structures,
changing over time. One driving theme behind communist political rhetoric, however,
was the manipulation of Czech identity and history. The 1953 Czech minister of culture,
Václav Kopecký, stated that, “We do not want merely to imitate someone else’s culture.
Our task is to create our own, Czech and Czechoslovak culture, and create it as the
culture of a new Czechoslovakia. [...] Our new culture, the culture of Czechoslovakia,
should be national in form.”39 Kopecký’s speech attempted to address the relationship
between Czech communism and nationalism. He referenced creating a new, but still
Czech, culture, which means drawing upon national history in conjunction with
communist innovation. More importantly this new (i.e. communist) culture was to be
national: defined by Czechness, as had the culture of the First Republic.
Understanding historical memory and national identity during a relatively
oppressive and unstable era requires an examination of both cultural and political
artifacts. I have thus utilized a variety of sources expanding beyond traditional historical
documents in order to reveal a more complete picture of the cultural side of memory and
nation-building under communism. Historical memory can manifest physically, in the
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form of lieux de mémoire, so architecture and statues are an important source base in this
thesis. Political speeches and writings reveal the communist government’s interpretation
of Czech history; thus, they provide information on the state-sponsored narrative,
including parts of the past that the politicians left out or altered. Finally, Czech literature
reflecting on the events of the communist era, such as the works of novelists Milan
Kundera and Bohumil Hrabal during the 1960s and 70s, are citizen accounts of the Czech
identity during the communist era. In contrast to communist government accounts, which
contain an official narrative that does not necessarily align with the lived experience of
the Czech population, literature provides a cultural perspective separate from the
communist government’s construct of reality. While researching an era driven by singleparty bureaucracy, it can be difficult to determine the success of cultural control policy.
In some cases, the measures seem more a performance than anything else. However,
placing sources produced by Czech citizens, such as novels or Radio Free Europe
interviews, in discussion with government statements shows the interaction between
political agendas, physical manifestations of Czech identity and memory, and the reaction
of the Czech public.
The history of how Czech communism interacted with historical memory and
national identity presents many contradictions. In the KSČ’s quest for legitimacy
amongst the Czech population, they attempted to twist the past to fit its own values, or
even erase it altogether. State-sponsored erasure and re-remembrance during this era
often disregarded the significance of historical symbols to the Czech population, and
when altering culturally valuable sites of memory, sometimes ignited resistance from the
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Czech population. The memory politics of the ČSSR thus demonstrated the extent to
which memory and cultural identity are intertwined.
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CHAPTER I
(RE)REMEMBERING THE BOHEMIAN REFORMATION:
Cultural Control and Appropriating Historical Narratives
In 1897, Czech-German Marxist Karl Kautsky wrote that,
It was in Bohemia that the earliest successful movement of the
Reformation occurred; it was there that heretical communism found the
first opportunity of clearly differentiating itself from the other heretical
sects. The Bohemian movement was of great importance to the German
communism of the Reformation as it was the forerunner of the latter.
Hence our attention must be first directed to the Hussites.40
Kautsky, like many communist historians, drew attention to the Bohemian Reformation
as an example of communism in its earliest form. By tracing the history of class division
and analyzing the Roman Catholic Church as a political and economic entity, Kautsky
framed religious dissidence as dissidence against class and political oppression. Hus and
his followers were communists in their rejection of the class inequality of the era,
according to Kautsky. Religious history was reconfigured as political and economic
history. He examined the Hussites through the theoretical lens of Marxist theory, arguing
that their departure from the Catholic Church and the community they established, Tábor,
were in fact signs that they followed communist principles centuries before Marx and
Engels defined the term.
Kautsky’s nineteenth-century musings were repeated by Czech politicians of the
communist era. This viewpoint was a far cry from the First Czechoslovak Republic’s
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view of the Bohemian Reformation as a symbol of “Czechness” during the interwar
period. In both eras, in fact thematically through Czech history, the Bohemian
Reformation has been glorified and commemorated in different ways according to
shifting political agendas. In the early fifteenth century, it was a Protestant narrative of
resistance toward the predominant Roman Catholic power and carried significantly
religious overtones. Centuries later, as the Czechoslovak state gained independence in the
early 1900s and struggled to define “Czechness,” it took on the meaning of Czech
strength in the face of an oppressing empire. Resistance and personal liberty, as the
Hussites symbolized, were some of the key characteristics of First Republic historical
memory. However, when the Czech communist party came to power, they discussed the
Bohemian Reformation on quite different terms; instead of Czech liberation or even the
Protestant religion, communist politicians and intellectuals framed it as a signifier of
communist values.41
In the system of historical symbols that makes up historical memory, the
Bohemian Reformation has repeatedly appeared in the discourse and physical
commemoration of Czech history, representing different values according to the political
and social circumstances. The constantly changing historical significance of the
Bohemian Reformation demonstrates the malleability of historical memory, particularly
for political purpose. Furthermore, analyzing the religious nature of the Bohemian
Reformation within the communist ideological context reveals a strange paradox
regarding the relationship between religion and communism. Although communism is a
41
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secular system––Marx’s famous declaration that “religion is the opium of the masses”
solidified that aspect––that did not deter the communist party from appropriating the
Bohemian Reformation as a powerful historical symbol.42
Although it occurred centuries prior to the First Czechoslovak Republic and the
ČSSR, mythologized visions of the Bohemian Reformation and its figures remain very
alive in historical memory. In order to appropriate the power of the Bohemian
Reformation as a historical symbol, the communist government worked to create an
alternative historical memory. This would also serve to prevent the Bohemian
Reformation’s historical metaphor of resistance from being used as a site of dissidence
against the regime. While the Czech population had framed the Austria-Hungary as an
oppressor comparable to the Roman Catholic Church at the time of the Reformation in
their commemorative politics, the communist government could avoid this resistance by
embracing the Bohemian Reformation. The communist version of the Bohemian
Reformation framed the icons not as religious figures or Czech national heroes, but as
heroes of the proletariat and symbols of communist values. Discussing the religious
movement as a social movement and focusing on the Hussite relationship to private
property, for example, built a vision of the communist Bohemian Reformation. Adopting
symbolism of the Bohemian Reformation, a familiar cultural narrative, could
hypothetically help rally support for the communist system, especially during times of
economic or political crisis. Ignoring blatant contradictions to communism, such as the
reformation’s creation of a Protestant religion, the regime twisted the narrative to support
42
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its political identity. Through political rhetoric as well as physical lieux de mémoire such
as Bethlehem Chapel and the National Monument of Vítkov, the KSČ not only analyzed
the Bohemian Reformation through a communist lens, but actively worked to use their
political power over Czech historical memory as a method of cultural control. Controlling
the official narratives, even if this control did not extend to the private sphere, would
provide a measure of control over the public reaction to the new communist structures.
The Bohemian Reformation and Hussite Religion
As the symbols and values of the Bohemian Reformation shifted for Czechs as
time went by, the meaning and memory became further and further removed from the
original events. The actual reformation was a religious, military, and cultural movement
that established the Hussite religion and several religious communities across the Czech
lands. The movement began when Jan Hus’s religious teachings began challenging those
of the Roman Catholic Church, which was a controlling political and religious force in
Europe at the time.43 Both because his sermons were accessible to the Czech public and
because the Roman Catholic Church was a ruling force over the Czech lands, Hus’s
theology quickly became popular; the preacher became the face of the Bohemian
Reformation and remains so to the present day.44
Hus’s theological approach focused on austerity and morality, which was
particularly relevant in an era during which the Church was a massive political entity, and
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often corrupt.45 He was committed to traditional Catholic teachings, developing what
became known as the Four Articles:
(1) That the most divine sacrament of the body and blood should be
administered by the ministers of the church to the faithful.
(2) That civil dominion, like a deadly poison, should be taken away from
the clergy.
(3) That the Word of God should be freely, publicly, and truthfully
preached by those whose concern it is to preach.
(4) That public and more notable sins should be suppressed through lawful
power by the faithful people.46
This rhetoric, particularly Hus’s demand that simony to be published through
legal outlets, threatened the Church officials, who burned Hus at the stake on 6 July
1415.47 The execution made Hus a martyr in the eyes of his followers, who began calling
themselves the Hussites, and his teachings became more popular than ever. As the
Hussite religion developed in Hus’s absence, the issue became increasingly militarized.
The Roman Catholic Church sent crusaders to stamp out the dissident religion, and the
Hussites formed troops to fight back. Jan Žižka became a leader of the reformation after
Hus’s death, and led battles against the Roman Catholic crusaders. Off of the battlefield,
the Hussites spread into different religious branches, the Taborites being the most
radical.48 In 1420, they established Tábor, in Southern Bohemia, where they lived a
minimalist life, strictly according to Hus’s principles. The Taborites differed from other
branches of Hussites in their abolition of private property; during the communist era,
45
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politicians would cite this as proof of the communist nature of the Bohemian
Reformation.
Changing Rhetoric
In communist discourse surrounding shifting symbols and narratives, it is clear the
Bohemian Reformation holds power as a moment of resistance and change in Czech
history. During both the First Republic and the communist era, political leaders
continuously framed the Bohemian Reformation as a symbol of what it historically means
to be Czech.49 This being said, changes in political atmosphere heavily affected how the
Bohemian Reformation was remembered and represented by different Czech
governments. Changing political rhetoric is one example of these transitions. The
government of the ČSSR, with its distinct political agenda, represented the Bohemian
Reformation differently than the First Republic, in attempt to manipulate cultural
perceptions of Czech history. Particularly during the ČSSR, politicians saw historical
memory of the Bohemian Reformation as a potential site of rebuilding the Czech identity.
When Pierre Nora stated that, “there is no such thing as spontaneous memory, hence that
we must create archives, mark anniversaries, organize celebrations, pronounce eulogies,
and authenticate documents,” he pointed out that creating history is active.50 Political
speeches and documents regarding the Bohemian Reformation are a part of actively
creating history by purposefully developing one cultural narrative over another.
After the 1918 dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the creation of the
First Czechoslovak Republic, the Bohemian Reformation gained power in Czech
49
50

Paces, Prague Panoramas, 115-38.
Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, 14.

28

historical memory. It played a role in the nation-building of this era, becoming part of the
national identity that was so necessary with the establishment of a new nation. Czech
nationalists found, or created, similarities between themselves and the Hussites. The
Hussites had led a period of resistance against a Catholic oppressor that was not so
different than the heavily Catholic Austro-Hungarian Empire, at least in the eyes of
Czech nationalists. The Bohemian Reformation thus came to represent liberty and
resistance, and the movement and its figures become important symbols in the new
Czechoslovakia. Hus and Žižka in particular were iconized as representations of Czechs
who fought for independence.51 Politicians and nationalists began creating lieux de
mémoire commemorating the era during the First Republic: for example, the Jan Hus
memorial in Staroměstské Náměstí (Prague’s Old Town Square), the “Jan Hus Jubilee”
planned near the end of World War I, and a massive monument to Jan Žižka that would
ultimately take decades to complete.52
The leaders of the First Republic contributed to the national narrative of the
Bohemian Reformation through their political rhetoric. Politicians such as Tomáš
Garrigue Masaryk, the first president of the First Republic, framed the Bohemian
Reformation as a moment in Czech history that defined the Czech culture, which was
important to the government’s goal of creating a unified Czech identity. Masaryk
discussed the significance of the Bohemian Reformation during the First Republic in a
1910 speech: “We see in the Czech Reformation a deeper manifestation of the Czech soul
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and of our national character.”53 Masaryk spoke of the Bohemian Reformation as not
only an important part of Czech history, but as a part of Czech national identity.
Historical memory was used as a tool to build the nation.
After the KSČ came to power, communist politicians created discourse that
attempted to alter and recreate the Bohemian Reformation as part of a communist
historical memory––not the historical memory of the First Republic. In recognition of the
power of this era within Czech memory, the Czech communist government worked to
appropriate its symbols and philosophy and incorporate them into its own rhetoric and
remembrance. Additionally, as an oppressive government, the KSČ wanted to avoid the
Bohemian Reformation becoming a symbol for Czech resistance against the regime, as
had happened to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was a politically-shrewd move to
embrace the Bohemian Reformation, with all its symbolism of national resistance, as a
symbol of the new, communist, nation.
One main point of argument that politicians used to “communize” the Bohemian
Reformation was that it was a social revolution, instead of a religious reformation. Deemphasizing the religious aspect of the reformation would serve the incredibly secular
political system.54 The minister of education, science and art, Zdeněk Nejedlý, was one of
the leading figures in political rhetoric that reframed historical memory, both in his
speeches and writings. In his 1946 work, The Communists – Inheritors of the Great
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Traditions of the Czech Nation (Komunisté dědici velikých tradic českého národa),
Nejedlý wrote:
Without doubt it is anachronistic to think that today Hus would be a
priest as he was then. Today Hus would be a leader of a political party
and his platform would not be the pulpit, but the Prague Lucerna Hall or
Wenceslas Square. And his party would be very close to us Communists–
–about that we can be convinced.55
Nejedlý’s work demonstrates one of the largest contradictions within communist rhetoric
surrounding the Bohemian Reformation: religion. Attempting to embrace the
revolutionary spirit of Hus’s actions, Nejedlý took the enthusiastic Czech memory for the
Bohemian Reformation––the Czech soul, if Masaryk is to be believed––and
“communized” it, placing it in his political sphere. In order to do so, he faced the task of
appropriating a religious movement for the highly secular communist order. Nejedlý,
who later described the Bohemian Reformation as “the first people’s democratic
revolution,” addressed this paradox by focusing on Hus and his followers as social
revolutionaries above religious figures.56 He imagined the reformation in its medieval
context, where the Catholic church was a political platform, to argue that Hus’s attacks
on the Church’s shortcomings were equivalent to contemporary political critiques.57
After de-emphasizing the religious aspect of the Bohemian Reformation, the next
task was to establish the era as a part of communist history and identity. While politicians
and intellectuals of the First Republic celebrated the Bohemian Reformation as a symbol
of Czech national liberation and resistance in the face oppression, the KSČ took a
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different route by associating the movement with the language of communism, instead of
Czechness. KSČ politicians worked to first connect the Hussites’ legacy to the
communist party and ideology, and second, to create lieux de mémoire framing the
Bohemian Reformation and the Hussites as part of communist history. These actions had
the potential to legitimize the communist government as inheritors of Czech history.
When Nejedlý wrote that Hus’s hypothetical political party “would be very close
to us Communists,” he argued that there were connections between Hussite and
communist values.58 Beyond negating Hus’s religious convictions, Nejedlý identified
with Hus as a fellow revolutionary. As a social movement, the Bohemian Reformation
apparently contained social implications more comparable to the Russian Revolution than
the development of Protestantism.59 A radical branch of Hus’s successors, the Taborites,
were often cited as further proof of the ideological relationship between Hussitism and
communism.60 The Táborites isolated themselves to form a town (Tábor) that rejected all
existing political and social systems, creating an attempted utopia ruled by Hus’s Four
Articles.61 Hus’s philosophy largely called for “vita apostolica and the primitive church
as the model for reform,” as religious historian Christopher Bellitto described, and the
Táborites rejected the practices of prayers for the dead, monasticism, confessions,
indulgences and the accumulation of clerical wealth by tithes or any civil dominion.62
Communist politicians and intellectuals interpreted this dramatically ideological lifestyle
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as similar to the ideological lifestyle that communist theory ascribed. The work towards a
utopia, as well as a communal pooling of resources, were particularly emphasized in
communist analyses of the Táborites. Communist theorists noted their collectivist policy
towards property in particular; in Tábor, there was no rent, as land was managed by
administrators, and possessions were made communal.63 Nejedlý wrote that, “private
property was abolished in [Tábor], and property communism––admittedly utopian, but
still communism––was introduced.”64 His analysis echoed Kautsky’s claim decades
before that, “these communists [the Táborites] were the vanguard of the democratic
movement.”65 Again, the religious aspect of Tábor was erased from historical discourse.
In order to create an image of communist Táborites, centuries before Marx critiqued
nineteenth century class struggle, only half of the story of Tábor was remembered.
Zdeněk Nejedlý’s rhetoric functioned just as powerfully as a physical monument
to politicize historical memory. As the minister of education, science and art, Nejedlý
held a certain amount of power over the cultural atmosphere in the ČSSR. Cultural
control included a certain “revision” of the Czech identity, no small part of which was the
historical memory.66 The success of cultural control is questionable––critics at the time
argued that Nejedlý and other communist politicians had “simplified history” and that
they were arguing that “only communists, in the past and in the present, fight against the
oppressors.”67 However, communist politicians created their own remembrance of a
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prominent era of history by forgetting the religious aspect of the Bohemian Reformation
and commemorating the aspects that aligned with the communist ideology. KSČ political
discourse built an alternative Czech history in attempt to place them as inheritors to the
legacy of the Bohemian Reformation, which would ultimately legitimize their place of
power in Czechoslovakia.
Rhetoric, though not a physical mark of historical memory like a statue or
building, is a powerful tool in rewriting a nation’s memory. The political speeches and
documents of Czechoslovakia’s communist era reveal the connections between the Czech
past and the communist-created present. Commemorations of the Bohemian Reformation,
such as Bethlehem Chapel and the National Monument of Vítkov, are simply physical
manifestations of the narratives that communist leaders built in their political rhetoric.
Bethlehem Chapel
Equally important to political rhetoric in reshaping historical memory are lieux de
mémoire. Although a building or statue may not be as explicit as a speech or writing, they
were part of the Czech communist government’s program to reshape Czech national
memory. One example is the 1954 renovation of Bethlehem Chapel, a church in Prague
used by Jan Hus himself between the years 1402 and 1413. Like Hus’s status as a
religious figure, which Nejedlý’s political discourse attempted to secularize, a religious
space would need to be secularized to be placed in communist history. Bethlehem Chapel
was a natural site of memory of Hus and the Bohemian Reformation, making it a
powerful reminder of the Czech past and a desirable space for the KSČ to commemorate
their version of history.
34

The Bethlehem Chapel was founded in 1391 by Prague shopkeeper Jan Kříž and
Hanuš of Mühlheim, a courtier, with the intention that all sermons in the space would be
held in the Czech language. It quickly became associated with Prague University, and
became a place for public debate amongst the more radical church community.68 Hus, at
the time a scholar at the university, began preaching at the chapel in 1402 and remained a
popular priest there until his arrest.69 During the Hapsburg era, the chapel continued to be
associated with Czech universities, but slowly fell into disrepair. By 1948, the space was
uninhabitable, but still remembered as a “symbolic center of the early church reform
movements in Bohemia.”70 At this point, the KSČ, newly in power, saw a symbolic
opportunity to make the Bohemian Reformation a part of the communist narrative.
When the idea to rebuild the chapel was launched at a state cabinet meeting in
July of 1948, only five months had passed since the Czechoslovak coup d'etat, during
which the KSČ forcibly folded the second most powerful political party, the Social
Democrats, in the Communist Party, and replaced leadership of any remaining nonCommunist parties with communist puppets.71 At this time, there were multiple pressures
on the state to adopt Czech symbols as a way to more smoothly implement a political
system that had been fairly violently seized. As one Czech-German emigrant reported to
Radio Free Europe in 1955, “many old buildings and monuments were restored,” and “all
churches were put in good order so that visitors would be impressed by the care that the
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State gives to churches.”72 Renovating influential spaces, even religious spaces, would
act as a show of goodwill on a cultural level. Lieux de mémoire, including Bethlehem
Chapel, were part of the system that balanced a power-hungry new regime with a nod to
important moments in Czech historical memory––or a communist interpretation of them.
In the years between the decision to renovate the chapel in 1948 and the 1954
opening ceremony, the government committee, led by Zdeněk Nejedlý, faced roadblocks
with renovation approval, property permissions, and finding an architect.73 Alois
Kubiček, an architect who had conducted research on the chapel during the First
Republic, was ultimately chosen for the job. Kubiček focused on the “authenticity” of
recreating the chapel as it had been, using medieval techniques for the ceramic tiles the
roof’s timberwork.74 Recreating the frescoes on the wall was a specific challenge, as
there were no surviving records that described them. Nejedlý recruited artists and art
historians to create medieval-style frescoes of Hus, as well as quotes from Hussite songs
and the Hussite-era Czech bible (Figure 1).75 The main fresco features Hus burning at the
stake surrounded by his followers and Catholics; between the composition and his
peaceful expression as he dies for his beliefs, the Christ-like imagery is obvious.
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Figure 1

Because Bethlehem Chapel was rebuilt with a focus on authenticity, it continued
to visually resemble a religious space. The choice to include biblical quotes and a heavily
Christian fresco may seem an unusual choice for a communist State-sponsored
renovation. However, the commitment to historical accuracy was accompanied by the
same rhetoric that Party politicians had used to reframe the history of the Bohemian
Reformation on a more general level. Hus, despite being painted as a Christ-like martyr
on the rear wall, was continually discussed as a political revolutionary in an era during
which the reformation was “not theological or religious, but a struggle against the church
as the highest financial power of the middle ages,” as Nejedlý continued to argue in a
speech about the chapel.76 The religious connotations of the space were juxtaposed with a
vehement insistence that Bethlehem Chapel was a representation of secular revolution.
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On 5 July 1954, members of the government and the public, along with Soviet
representatives, gathered to celebrate the newly repaired, and newly charged, building.
According to one newspaper report, old Czech Protestant hymns alternated with
Czechoslovak and Soviet anthems, as the crowd gathered.77 Zdeněk Nejedlý was once
again at the head of reinterpreting historical memory as he gave a speech from the pulpit
where Jan Hus had once preached. Like in his book, The Communists – Inheritors of the
Great Traditions of the Czech Nation, Nejedlý emphasized Hus’s actions in a social
justice context, discussing how, in this very building, he had stood up to authority,
enabled the common people by preaching in Czech, and offered communion wine to the
congregation, not drawing lines among social groups.78 In his speech, Nejedlý claimed,
Bethlehem was absolutely not what usually one thinks of when one hears
‘chapel.’ A chapel is thought to be something small, tiny . . . but here one
can fit three thousand people, more than a large church, and so this chapel
is something more... It was not a church or a chapel.79
Despite this claim, the official capacity of Bethlehem Chapel today is four hundred
people.80 Nejedlý rewrote reality to align with his politics. Similarly to the way he
described Hus as a revolutionary, he talked about Bethlehem Chapel as a gathering place,
a site for public discourse, a site of revolution: anything other than a church. There was a
contradiction between the fixation on exactly replicating Bethlehem Chapel as it
historically had been and changing its symbolic status in historical memory.
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Bethlehem Chapel is one of the more paradoxical sites of memory in Prague. For
hundreds of years, it represented more than a building, even as it began crumbling to the
ground. The Czech population recognized it as a birthplace of a powerful era in historical
memory; in this way, the chapel adopted the meaning of the reformation itself. When
cultural officials such as Nejedlý made the decision to rebuild Bethlehem Chapel, they
were not only renovating a physical space, but the memory of Hus and the Bohemian
Reformation. Kubiček’s focus on accurately reconstructing a religious structure, down to
the fresco of Hus’s execution, would seem to imply that the chapel would be revived as a
religious space, to continue the theological aspect of the reformation. However,
politicians like Nejedlý felt differently. Even though the chapel was by definition a
religious lieu de mémoire, they used it as a platform to further secularize the Bohemian
Reformation.
Jan Žižka and the National Monument
Following the pattern of twisting rhetoric and image to fit communist theory are
commemorations of Jan Žižka during the communist era. After Hus’s death, Žižka, as a
follower and contemporary of the preacher, led the radical Hussites into battle to defend
their Protestant religion. The one-eyed warrior became known for his innovative military
techniques, as he quickly trained peasant Hussites to fight trained Roman Catholic
crusaders, and actually won several battles.81 Žižka represented military heroism and the
power of the Czech nation long before the ČSSR. As arguably the most famous Czech
warrior in historical memory, Žižka’s legacy was a platform to recreate memory and
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legitimize

communism

in

Czech

culture.

The

communist

government

used

commemoration to shift what Žižka signified in Czech history to something that would
support its agenda.
One of the most visible commemorations
of the KSČ’s fight for “the soul of the
Czech nation” is a monument called
National Monument of Vítkov, featuring a
statue of Jan Žižka, whose construction
spanned from the 1920 to 1950. Watching
over Prague’s historically working class
Žižkov neighborhood, the thirty foot tall
equestrian statue of the famed Hussite
warrior caps a concrete building (Figure
2).82

Rapidly

circumstance
Figure 2

changing

caused

massive

political
delays

between the laying of the foundation

stone, which occurred in the First Republic, and the actual construction, which was not
completed until in the early communist era. The massive statue of Žižka serves to remind
the Czech public of both Žižka’s importance in history and in the present. The
commemorative space’s symbolic meaning changed alongside the shift from the First
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Republic to the ČSSR. Like political discourse or commemorations of Hus, Žižka’s
legacy was appropriated by the KSČ to make Czech national identity more inherently
communist.
The National Monument was planned, though not completed, during the First
Republic, at which point the Bohemian Reformation and Jan Žižka stood for
independence and resisting a controlling external power. The monument at its conception
thus commemorated a version of the Bohemian Reformation that was specifically tailored
for First Republic political goals. Žižka was to be a symbol of a fight for independence,
which was particularly appropriate for Czechoslovakia directly after World War I.
However, the memory politics surrounding Žižka would quickly change alongside the
Czechoslovak government.
The choice of site for the National Monument of Vítkov, Vítkov Hill, had just as
much importance as the subject himself. Vítkov Hill became a place of victory after
Žižka and his army of Hussite peasants unexpectedly defeated the imperial army of
crusaders in a battle on the hill in 1420.83 Like Žižka, the hill became an icon for resisting
external oppression and protecting the Czech identity in battle. The physical location thus
enhanced the power of the monument: the statue was connected to the geographic
landscape in addition to Žižka as a Czech hero. Its location in Prague also held
connections to the Bohemian Reformation in Czech historical memory. Members of the
working class, who often lived in the Žižkov neighborhood, tended towards strong
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feelings of nationalism during the First Republic.84 The monument was a symbol of
Czech nationalism as the newly formed state created a national identity.
Construction on the monument was halted with the 1938 Nazi occupation of the
Second World War. The building was mostly finished by the end of the First Republic,
but the equestrian statue remained uncompleted. During the war, German occupiers used
the structure to store weapons and ammunition.85 This can be seen as another symbolic
change; the lieu de mémoire had been desecrated, transformed from a space to honor
Czech resistance and identity to a meaningless storage facility for an invading force. In
halting the construction of a cultural monument and making the space utilitarian, the
German forces took a symbolic as well as physical stance against resistance and
independence in the Czechoslovak nation.
After the Nazi occupation, construction on the equestrian statue resumed on
Vítkov Hill. Žižka, the ultimate Czech warrior, stood as a powerful and aggressive
symbol after an occupation that Czechs had been unable to fight. In the post-World War
II era, the Czech population either felt a sense of weakness from the Nazi occupation, or
survivors’ guilt from having fared relatively well in comparison to the Jewish population
or their Polish neighbors. The KSČ connected Žižka to “a more masculine
characterization of Czech history [... which] would commemorate a Czech victory and
boost the self-esteem of a nation that lacked military heroics.”86 Žižka became more
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relevant than ever, even though the government that promoted his image often acted as an
oppressive force.
At the monument’s unveiling celebration in 1950, minister of national defense
Alexej Čepička made a speech, stating, “Today, after the overthrow of the government of
oppressors,... our people’s democratic army proclaims Žižka’s legacy.”87 Čepička, while
discussing Czechoslovakia’s liberation from Nazi occupation (aided by the Soviets)
connected the new communist State to the Hussite legacy of resistance and glory, using
rhetoric that the Soviet army liberated Prague from the Nazi invaders, so they must stand
on similar ground to the Hussite warriors. In contrast to Masaryk’s claim that the
Bohemian Reformation is “a deeper manifestation the Czech soul and of our national
character,” Čepička was significantly more focused on the militant aspect. While
Masaryk emphasized the Czech national identity––appropriately so in the era of nationbuilding––Čepička connected Žižka’s military legacy to the monument. By discussing an
“overthrow” of an oppressive government,” he commemorated the end of the Second
World War, with all of its communist implications, in addition to the Bohemian
Reformation.
Few moments in history experienced the same longevity in Czech memory as the
Bohemian Reformation. The Bohemian Reformation and its key actors left a legacy that
was so powerful it became a political tool centuries after the event. It was pursued as a
historical symbol worth re-imagining in order to better integrate communist values into
the Czech identity. The KSČ’s discourse and commemoration of the Bohemian
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Reformation is an example of how a government can use the past to legitimize its
politics, even if the past needs to be re-interpreted to do so. The changing narratives of
the Bohemian Reformation, told both verbally and through commemorative spaces,
demonstrate the malleability of historical memory, especially in a political context. While
some moments in history are lost, or even intentionally forgotten, different Czech
governments commemorated different versions of the story of the Bohemian Reformation
to define what it means to be Czech.
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CHAPTER II
REPLACING THE FIRST REPUBLIC:
Delegitimizing Popular Sovereignty Through Historical Erasure
In 1955, the secretary of the KSČ Regional Committee in Ostrava, Miloš Svoboda, wrote,
We have to deal a lot with social-democratism in many factories and
villages. In its present state, social-democratism can also be seen in the
endeavour to weaken the union of the workers and the working small and
medium farmers. With the help of propaganda lectures, the regional
organisation managed to deal with the remnants of the Masaryk liedemocracy and the lie-humanity, so much praised by the Traitor abroad,
which still find an echo in some of our citizens, as well as with the opinion
that it was not Masaryk’s fault that the working people lived in poverty,
hunger, and unemployment during the capitalist regime…88
Svoboda expressed the perspective that the legacy of the First Czechoslovak Republic (in
this case, in the form of first president, Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk) was an active
mythology amongst Czech citizens. He also pointed out that support or nostalgia for the
First Republic was potentially damaging to the communist state. Svoboda’s language,
such as calling the First Republic a “lie-democracy” or “capitalist regime,” and Masaryk
a “Traitor,” while admittedly dramatic, is an example of the communist government’s
work to delegitimize the First Republic and all that it stood for.
The First Czechoslovak Republic was an era that formed the framework of Czech
national identity in the twentieth century. Beginning at the 1918 establishment of
Czechoslovakia as formal state and ending with the 1938 Nazi occupation of the area, it
was during the First Republic that Czechs developed a unified sense of “Czechness,” as
88
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well as a more defined mythology of their history. Czech nationalists and politicians
formed a “creation myth” centered around the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, one
of the main reasons Czechoslovakia was able to become a state, and glorified the actors
involved––from the Czech soldiers of World War I to the first president.89
The First Republic left behind a system of political norms that often contradicted
the political agendas of the ČSSR. There is no doubt that the First Republic was a
formative era for the Czech culture, producing notions of independence and popular
sovereignty. These norms could not evaporate with a change in government; even as the
national identity is constantly changing, it is difficult to remove or alter a tradition that is
embedded in national rituals and consciousness, which can consequently become sites of
resistance.90 However, the communist party severely criticized the First Republic and
what it stood for, which influenced how they remembered and commemorated the era
during the ČSSR. They argued that it was inherently corrupt due to its capitalist structure
and its relationship with Western capitalist powers. In short, it was a “sham” of a
democracy, as Czech historian Bradley Abrams describes.91 Furthermore, the First
Republic, as a representation of popular sovereignty and functional democracy,
threatened the communist system. Both the political structures and what the First
Republic symbolized in historical memory contradicted the KSČ’s ideological and
political values.
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These aversions to the history of the First Republic manifested in erasure and
delegitimization of several First Republic symbols. For example, the Czechoslovak
Legionnaires, who were a group of World War I Czech soldiers, were heavily glorified
and commemorated by Czech nationalists during the First Republic but were wiped from
history by the communist government. The Legionnaires had fought against the AustroHungarian military after being captured by the Russian White army.92 Because they
battled the colonizing force, the Legionnaires became symbols of Czech military
prowess, liberty, and resistance.93 In response to these powerful associations, which
potentially disagreed with the political agenda, the KSČ de-emphasized commemorations
of the Legionnaires. Instead, they memorialized the actions of Soviet soldiers during the
Second World War to legitimize a communist symbol in Czech history. As World War II
came to a close in 1945, it was the Soviet Red Army that arrived in Nazi-occupied
Prague, killing or capturing any remaining Nazi troops.94 The acts of shifting
commemoration from First Republic values to communist values reflects the KSČ’s use
of memory politics to redefine Czechoslovakia’s military identity. The KSČ also
addressed the legacy of Masaryk, one of the most iconic Czech names of the twentieth
century, in their remembrance and erasure. As a “Founding Father” figure, Masaryk
represented democracy and popular sovereignty in the Czech imagination. His influence
on the Czech identity was so difficult to erase that communist politicians originally
attempted to claim his legacy as their own. However, his memory proved too entangled
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with the capitalist and democratic aspects of the First Republic that the KSČ had rejected,
and they ultimately abandoned glorifying his narrative in favor of more communist
figures.95
While the state commemorated some moments in Czech history in attempt to
reconcile Czech culture with communism, they often delegitimized and even erased the
First Republic. First Republic symbols that embodied ideas of multi-party democracy
and personal liberty were potential sites of resistance against the single-party, and often
oppressive, communist government. These symbols, including the Czechoslovak
Legionnaires and eventually Masaryk, were worth erasing in order to legitimize the
communist system as it transitioned from the First Republic democracy. Unlike the
Bohemian Reformation, which was twisted to fit neatly into the vocabulary of communist
history, historical memory of the First Republic during the ČSSR demonstrated erasure of
certain events and key figures. Ernest Renan suggested that, “forgetting, even historical
error,” is the foundation of building a nation; the KSČ’s approach to Czech memories of
the First Republic shows the power of forgetting in constructing new national
narratives.96 As a way to legitimize the oppressive politics of the communist era, the KSČ
“forgot,” or erased, historical symbols of the First Republic in order to delegitimize
Czech notions of popular sovereignty.
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Communist Criticisms of the First Republic
The legitimacy of Czechoslovak democracy, specifically First Republic democracy, was
under attack by Czech communists from 1918 to the ČSSR, at which point became only a
memory. Contrary to many communist analyses, the First Czechoslovak Republic was in
fact “the most prosperous, progressive, and democratic state of East Central Europe,”
according to historian Joseph Rothschild.97 It was incredibly stable due to nineteenth
century industrialization, which continued into the early 1900s.98 The relative success of
this era was irrelevant to Party members; they formed arguments against the morality and
success of the First Republic’s democracy. Communist politicians and intellectuals
defined morality as being centered around Marx’s ideas of class equality and
overthrowing capitalism. As communism rose post-World War II, communists declared
the capitalist First Republic government a bourgeoisie construction, designed to oppress
the proletariat as the new nation took shape: therefore, inherently immoral. Any
economic success was in fact proof that the state was dependent on foreign capitalist
powers to maintain its wealth, making it a cog in the machine of global capitalism. These
notions of the First Republic as inherently immoral created a foundation for rejecting its
historical symbols.
The idea of sacrificing morality for the sake of stability on an international level
was eloquently expressed in 1946 by Jiří Hájek, who would later become a diplomat for
the KSČ: “For the securing of our geographic foundation against German and Hungarian
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revisionist pressure, our democracy had to pay by participation in securing the society
against revolutionary pressures.”99 Hájek was not wrong; Masaryk and his colleagues had
formed Czechoslovakia through diplomatic negotiations with the Allies at the close of
World War I, making a commitment to the desires of more powerful Western European
nations. The late Austro-Hungarian Empire had been a major player in Europe’s
international economic and social structures, and Western Powers had no desire to
reconfigure that landscape as new Central European nations were forming.100 Therefore,
part of the Czechoslovak political and economic systems included maintaining the profit
structures from prewar Europe in order to exist as the sovereign state that Czech
nationalists so enthusiastically embraced––even though it meant “securing the society
against revolutionary pressure,” or not re-inventing economic and political structures to
be more equal. Although the First Republic was the most “progressive” of the newly
formed Central European nations during the interwar period, with high levels of literacy,
unemployment insurance, an eight hour workday, and a large pool of skilled labor, it was
decidedly capitalist.101 The type of revolution that would implement a completely new
political or economic system (such as had happened in Russia) was out of the question in
order to maintain positive relations with the Western powers that had helped create, and
could easily crush, Czechoslovakia. Communist critics looked beyond the relative
success of the First Republic to argue that it was a democracy built upon perpetuating a
capitalist, and inherently class-oppressive, international system.
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Communist politicians further emphasized the immorality and inferiority of the
First Republic by comparing it to the morality of a communist society. In defining
morality by on class relations, they created a mythology of the First Republic as an
oppressive, cruel moment in Czech history. KSČ central committee member, Jiří
Hendrych, wrote that “from the viewpoint of the new morality, what is moral is which
aids in the definitive defeat of the old world, the world of oppression and poverty, and
helps build the new world that is rushing toward socialism.”102 Hendrych, among other
politicians, defined the morality of the First Republic as the antithesis of the morality of
the ČSSR. He framed the dichotomy of historical Czech capitalism and current Czech
communism as a dichotomy of the immoral and the moral, or an era of the bourgeoisie
oppressing the working class and a more progressive world working towards Marx’s
utopia. By using the term “new morality,” Hendrych emphasized the communist era as a
new social order with new values; but he is perfectly clear that the new morality is
superior than the any morals from the old “world of oppression and poverty,” as he titles
the First Republic.
Communist politicians drew from the end of the First Republic as further proof of
its systemic inadequacy. The First Republic ended in 1938, with the Munich Agreement.
The Munich Agreement was a settlement between Great Britain, France, Italy, and
Germany, that allowed Germany to annex part of western Czechoslovakia. They did not
consult the Czechoslovak government. From there, the First Republic quickly unraveled
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as Slovakia seceded and the Nazis occupied the Czech Republic.103 Related to the line of
rhetoric that the First Republic was too aligned with foreign capitalists, communist
politicians pointed out that Czechoslovak government had been unable to maintain
political independence, in part because it was too economically controlled by other
foreign powers.104 While a myriad of factors had led to Germany’s annexation of western
Czechoslovakia, international relations with capitalist powers were the easiest for
communist politicians to use as evidence of the First Republic’s political and economic
weakness.
Criticisms of political or economic circumstances aside, one of the primary
reasons that the KSČ worked to delegitimize symbols of the First Republic was the era’s
association with popular sovereignty and individual liberty. During the communist era,
the government limited many of the Czech citizens’ rights to make decisions, on political,
economic, and social levels. The government attempted to legitimize this oppression by
delegitimizing Czech notions of popular sovereignty, particularly in terms of the First
Republic. The KSČ erased historical symbols from their sites of commemoration in order
to maintain communist mythology, often replacing them with symbols that perpetuated a
communist historical narrative.
Erasing and Replacing the Legionnaires
The Czechoslovak Legionnaires, the most mythologized Czechoslovak troops of the First
World War, play a vital role in the story of building and destroying historical memory in
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Czechoslovakia. While the Czech nationalists of the First Republic commemorated the
Legionnaires as a way to build and define the Czech identity, communist politicians
replaced commemorations of the Legionnaires with the Soviet army, which not only
symbolically removed them from Czech national memory, but also attempted to frame
the Soviet troops as a part of Czech culture and history. Replacing First Republic military
heroes with Soviets would also replace the idea of Czechoslovakia as a powerful and
proud nation with the idea that it was dependent upon and in debt to the Soviet Union.
The Czechoslovak Legionnaires, and how they were commemorated and erased,
exemplifies one way the KSČ used historical “forgetting” to deal with the anticommunist historical memory of the First Republic.
It is common for military symbols to hold power in a nation’s historical memory.
Wars and their aftermath are often defining moments in a national history, igniting
political, economic, and social change. Military commemorations reflect the impact of
wars in the collective memory. Not only are they extremely common, from memorials to
Veterans Day to “tombs of the unknown soldier,” but they carry more weight than
commemorating the death of an individual soldier. Rather, military symbols in national
memory commemorate the larger concepts of defending the nation and the ways a war
has shaped the nation’s development.105 The impact that military symbols have on
national identity is reflected in the shift in military commemorations from the First
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Republic to the ČSSR, as well as how the KSČ attempted to erase the remnants of First
Republic historical memory.
As the KSČ built a new national identity, it created a network of military
symbolism commemorating the recent Second World War. In doing so, it also erased the
military symbolism built around World War I that had been so important to the First
Republic Czech identity. The Czechoslovak Legionnaires, as one of the most prominent
national military symbols of the First Republic, were a vital part of this memory building
and dismantling. Because they fought for the White Army, the opposing force to the
communist Red Army during the Russian Civil War, the Legionnaires were not
remembered kindly by the KSČ. However, the First Republic discourse surrounding them
remembers them as heroically initiating Czechoslovakia’s freedom from the AustroHungarian Empire, rather than associating them with the act of surrendering or the
trauma of a Russian prison camp. This glorification reflects the attempt to build a
narrative of pride for Czechoslovakia’s recent liberation from the Austro-Hungarian
Empire.106 There were even connections between the Legionnaires and the Bohemian
Reformation; two of their units were named for Jan Hus and Jan Žižka, showing deep
associations between Czech soldiers in the twentieth century and the medieval movement
that was embedded in the national consciousness.107 The Legionnaires thus became
representations of the Czechoslovak military spirit and victory over colonialism.
Although Czechs of the First Republic commemorated the Legionnaires in a
myriad of forms, one of the most visible, and most attacked by the KSČ, was the National
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Monument of Vítkov. The National Monument, in addition to the enormous statue of Jan
Žižka, includes a commemorative space originally dedicated to the First Republic. The
monument’s architects added the massive concrete building to the plan as
commemoration

grew

increasingly popular during
the First Republic (Figure
3).108 Unlike the statue, the
structure

served

as

a

memorial space for the far
more recent World War I,
rather than the Bohemian

Figure 3

Reformation. The building
was completed before the statue, in 1947––one year before the communist party seized
control of the Czechoslovak government.109 Both at its inception and during the
communist era, it served as a commemorative space, with artwork, room for ceremonies,
and even mausoleums. Both the exterior statue of Žižka and the interior commemorations
represented connections to the nation’s memory and found different ways to physically
display it. In the initial stages of planning during the First Republic, before the KSČ
appropriated the site of remembrance in 1950, the memorial building was intended to
display the newly established symbols of Czech liberty and nationhood. Since the end of
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the First World War, Czech nationalists had been spreading commemorative symbols of
the Legionnaires across Czechoslovakia.110 These commemorations made the
Legionnaires into symbols of the military side of the recent liberation from the AustroHungarian Empire: an appropriate match to the external statue of Žižka, the main military
hero of the Bohemian Reformation. As Czech historian Cynthia Paces describes,
“Originally planned simply as a monument to Žižka, the site took on broader dimensions
after the declaration of independent Czechoslovakia, when nationalists proclaimed the
need for a memorial in Prague of national liberation.”111 Commemorating the
Legionnaires and other symbols of the First Republic in a building attached to a largerthan-life statue of Jan Žižka would form powerful associations between the First
Republic heroes and the Bohemian Reformation.
However, members of the KSČ ministry of culture reimagined the original
building, like other sites of memory all over Czechoslovakia. Similarly to the renovation
of Bethlehem Chapel, the National Monument was a structure that had acted as a sign for
Czech values in the First Republic which the government altered on a symbolic level for
political gain. Unlike the communist commemoration of the Bohemian Reformation, this
shift in memory was a case of historical erasure. While KSČ politicians argued that Hus
and Žižka were in fact communists, and thus worthy of commemoration, they deemed the
Legionnaires so incompatible with communist ideology that their legacy must be painted
over. In the First Republic, the Legionnaires had represented overthrowing a controlling
force––the Austro-Hungarian Empire––which made their symbolic legacy a threat to the
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communist regime. Furthermore, they were a “foundation stone” in creating the First
Republic national identity, meaning they played a role in creating the so-called
oppressive, bourgeoisie democracy.112 Historical memory of the Legionnaires was so
intertwined with the political norms of the First Republic that it inherently contradicted
the KSČ’s agenda. The commemorations of the Legionnaires in the National Monument
of Vítkov, and more importantly how the KSČ eradicated them, demonstrate the politics
of forgetting when forging a new historical memory for a new political system.
The contrast between the original intentions of the First Republic government and
the communist revisions is clear when analyzing the artistic changes in the monument.
The National Monument is architecturally structured in the form of a Gothic cathedral,
with a large main space and several smaller “side chapels.” The side chapels were
designed to serve as specific sites of commemoration, while the main space is a
ceremonial hall. In yet another ideological battle, the KSČ faced Christian implications
embedded into the very floor plan of the building. While government officials could
hardly alter the building’s structure, they did make alterations to the displays and artwork
of the interior. One side chapel, literally titled “the Legionnaires’ Chapel,” was one of the
most significant commemorations to the Legionnaires in Prague. In the center of the
chapel, there was an edifice built to hold the cremated remains of the Legionnaires upon
their deaths. The room featured elaborate mosaics of the World War I soldiers surrounded
by allegorical figures, full of Christian symbolism.113 Although the mosaics’ creator,
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Max Švabinský, continued to be a highly regarded artist throughout the communist era,
the KSČ objected to the mosaics because of the way they glorified the Legionnaires. To
amend this First Republic space in favor of communist symbols, the state changed the
name of the Legionnaires’ Chapel to the “Hall of the Fallen Soldiers” and filled it with
signs and poetry celebrating the Red Army.114
Changing the names of sites of memory was an important component of the
KSČ’s program to alter historical memory. Czech theorist Vladimír Macura wrote, “In
Czechoslovakia, renaming became all too common due to the political and historical
upheavals of the twentieth century. Surprisingly, the new names reflected not only the
latest ideological reality but also the inherent need for continuation and custom.”115 The
newly titled Hall of the Fallen Soldiers built upon a tradition of military commemoration,
which was clearly valued in Czech historical memory, but subverted it to celebrate
communism. Retitling the chapel as the Hall of the Fallen Soldiers secularized the space
by using the word “hall” instead of “chapel,” but, more significantly, erased the specific
symbolism of the Legionnaires to encompass a wider memory of military history. “Fallen
Soldiers,” as a term, does not specifically denote Czechness. In the context of post-World
War II military commemoration, it could easily include Soviet soldiers, adding
communist symbolism to the physical site of memory. The new narrative was further
perpetuated by the signs and poetry devoted to the Red Army. While the Legionnaires
were a case of the Czechs defending their own land, commemorating the Red Army in
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Czechoslovakia painted a picture of external rescuers of a helpless and occupied Prague.
There is a stark contradiction between the place the Legionnaires occupied in Czech
national memory (serving to build nationalism during the creation of a new state) and the
new overlay of non-Czech figures. Replacing the Legionnaires, essentially removing
them from historical memory, delegitimized the mythology of powerful Czech military
resistance and created new notions that Czechoslovakia was dependent on the Soviet
Union.
Another side chapel, the “Hall
of the Red Army”, further emphasized
way

the

KSČ

built

connections

between the Soviet Union and Czech
historical memory, this time through
the use of a “Tomb of the Unknown
Soldier” (Figure 4).116 Scholar of
nationalism, Aviel Roshwald, wrote
Figure 4

that Tombs of the Unknown Soldier

have “become a widespread nationalist tradition whose power lies not only in the
anonymity of the individual remains lying within it, but also the nonspecificity of the
time it refers to.”117 In a monument with a statue of a Hussite warrior atop a building
commemorating more recent memory, this quote becomes especially relevant. The
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symbolic tomb was originally conceptualized as a “Tomb of the Unknown Legionary.”118
In this way, it connected the history of the Hussite Wars to the nationalism-based
symbols of the Legionnaires in the First Republic. The communist re-interpretation then
commemorated the Red Army rather than the Legionnaires. With this, it became a tomb
of an unknown Soviet soldier, not a Czech one. Thus continued the tradition of
nonspecificity in both individual and time frame: a tomb supposedly commemorating the
Red Army’s sacrifices in the 1940s existed in a monument that commemorated the
Bohemian Reformation of the 1400s as well as the First Republic in the 1920s and 30s.
The importance of commemorating the past, particularly the military past, was utilized by
the communist regime when they appropriated the Tomb of the Unknown Legionnaire
and, while keeping the sacredness of a Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, instead
commemorated a symbol of communism.
Mirroring the dramatic change in political values and goals, military
commemorations underwent a massive transition between the First Republic and the
ČSSR. The shift from commemorating the Legionnaires to the Red Army reveals the
power of both entities in Czech historical memory. The Legionnaires clearly held power
in the First Republic through glorification and commemoration. During the ČSSR, their
cultural significance was acknowledged in a very different way, when the government
attempted to delegitimize notions of Czech resistance and liberty by removing physical
commemorations. This symbolic forgetting is as much a political maneuver as
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commemorating a moment in history; the KSČ legitimized their present by removing
threatening remnants of the past, such as the Legionnaires.
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, The President-Liberator
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk is so prominent in Czech historical memory that communist
politicians faced an even more difficult task in dealing with his legacy than that of the
Czechoslovak Legionnaires. Erasing symbols of Masaryk, as a beloved “Founding
Father” figure in Czech mythology, had the potential to cause unrest or dissidence. The
communist party initially tried to appropriate his popularity and re-interpret his works as
communist. However, Masaryk’s legacy was so tied up in the anti-communist aspects of
the First Republic that any communist support rang as hollow.119 As the government
became increasingly controlling during the Stalinist years, Masaryk’s legacy as a symbol
of popular sovereignty and Czech liberty became threatening to the KSČ, and a potential
site of resistance. Eventually, the KSČ halted attempts to reclaim his memory and began
the process of delegitimizing Masaryk, as a way to legitimize their opposing political
actions. The shifts in how the Czech Communist Party commemorated Masaryk as a
symbol of the First Republic reveal the complexities of appropriating national symbols
that misalign with the predominant ideology.
Masaryk fits into the mythology of the “Founding Fathers,” a term often used to
describe the creators of the U.S. constitution, but that has a richer meaning in the context
of historical memory and national mythology. “Founding Fathers” are part of national
creation myths, stories used to connect a national identity to the nation’s inception.
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Masaryk, as the first president and a key figure in creating Czechoslovakia, was thus part
of the Czechoslovak creation myth and the foundation of First Republic identity. The
term “Founding Father” implies that the individual was both a creator and shaper of the
nation––playing a role in how it became a political entity and in defining the nation.
From Masaryk’s presidency onwards, he was conceptualized as a “father” of the
Czechoslovak nation and national identity, which would be crucial in the KSČ’s
decisions on how to commemorate him.120
Masaryk rose to fame and adoration when he became one of the primary
advocates for Czech statehood, especially at the close of World War I.121 This political
reputation led to his presidency, but also his placement within the Czech “pantheon” of
historical figures: Hus, Žižka, Saint Wenceslas, and more. In 1945, one Czech theologian
went so far as to call the First Republic “The Era of Masaryk.”122 The president was more
than a recognizable symbol of Czech independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire;
he was also a defining symbol of the time period during which Czechoslovakia became a
nation. Czech citizens often credited the successful aspects of First Republic democracy,
from economic prosperity to citizen representation in government, to Masaryk, making
him a historical symbol of popular sovereignty and liberty.
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What made Masaryk and all he stood for so appealing to the Czechs of the First
Republic was also what made him threatening to the communist regime. His informal
title, the “President-Liberator” (“Prezident Osvoboditel” in Czech), reflects his place in
historical memory on a most basic level: Czechs saw Masaryk as a politically powerful
individual who could bring independence from a controlling external force. In the First
Republic, this force was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After the 1948 coup d’état,
however, memories of a President-Liberator could be applied against the KSČ or the
Soviet Union with dangerous ease. In an era of a singular controlling political party,
Masaryk, as a symbol, needed to be delegitimized. Everything that communist politicians
had criticized about the First Republic—its “sham” of a democracy, its dependence on
global capitalism—had been founded by Masaryk along with the First Republic itself.
Masaryk was simultaneously too powerful a figure to ignore and a representation of anticommunism in First Republic historical memory.
Communist politicians therefore faced the difficult task of taking a figure who had
explicitly criticized Marxism and communism (in writing) and forming a coherent
argument that the ČSSR was part of his legacy.123 One way KSČ politicians attempted to
communize Masaryk’s memory, remembering it on their own terms whilst stripping it of
the anti-communist First Republic connotations, was by examining his pre-World War I
scholarship. Masaryk’s most controversial moves had occurred before his career in
politics, when he defended a Jew accused of murder in the “Hilsner Affair,” and the
“Manuscript Controversy” during which he (correctly) declared that ancient documents
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regarding Czech lands were forgeries.124 The Manuscript Controversy in particular
challenged Czech identity during the Austro-Hungarian Empire because it challenged
prior conceptions of Czech-German borders. Communists latched onto both of these
controversies as proof that Masaryk had fought against the bourgeoisie establishment. In
reality, Masaryk often critiqued the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but not along lines of
class inequality; he wanted to dismantle the empire and create a (non-communist)
Czechoslovak nation.
By the early 1950s, the KSČ’s treatment of Masaryk’s legacy had gone more the
way of Czechoslovak Legionnaires. Politicians stopped attempting to claim his ideas as
communist and went the route of undermining his memory and replacing it with more
explicitly communist symbols.125 Miloš Svoboda’s claim that the First Republic was “the
Masaryk lie-democracy and the lie-humanity,” and that it was “Masaryk’s fault that the
working people lived in poverty, hunger, and unemployment during the capitalist regime”
was only the beginning of the attacks on the former president’s memory.126 There are two
possible explanations for this shift in commemorative politics, according to the historical
context. By 1950, Soviet-style communism had taken hold of Czechoslovakia, and
communist leaders had to answer to Soviet president Joseph Stalin for major political
decisions. By 1952, most institutions had been collectivized as part of the Five Year Plan,
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resulting in economic destruction. The first of the show trials occurred the same year.127
The political climate was brutal and oppressive when the KSČ began their erasure and
delegitimization scheme for upon memory of Masaryk. Perhaps, the leaders felt secure
enough in their power and control that they no longer saw the need to use Masaryk as a
symbol to legitimize their claim to governing Czechoslovakia. What seems more likely,
especially considering their increasingly authoritarian nature, is a fear of the notions of
democracy and popular sovereignty that inevitably accompanied commemorating
Masaryk.128 These notions could facilitate a potential site of resistance. Attacking and
delegitimizing Masaryk’s place in Czech historical memory was easier than attempting to
twist the pro-democracy President-Liberator into a communist symbol, especially in an
era such of harsh policy.
There is ample record of the KSČ renaming streets that had been named after
Masaryk (Masarykova třida) throughout Czechoslovakia.129 They tore down monuments
and memorials to the former leader in Prague, Brno, Plzen, Bratislava, Kroměříž, Jiříkov,
Kladno, and other cities.130 One of the more morbid symbolic gestures intended to erase
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Masaryk and implement a more communist legacy occurred in a mausoleum in the
National Monument of Vítkov. The mausoleum had originally been built to house
Masaryk’s body upon his death. Although Masaryk ultimately declined this offer and was
buried in the small town of Lány in 1937, the mausoleum’s construction was part of the
“cult of death” that surrounded commemorations of famous figures during the turn of the
century. The space was to preserve Masaryk’s political significance, and Masaryk’s
remains would reciprocally make the space a sacred symbol of the era.
The original intention behind the mausoleum was lost in 1953 with the death of
the first General Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, Klement Gottwald.
Following in the footsteps of Lenin and Stalin, Party leaders decided to embalm
Gottwald’s body and exhibit the remains at Vítkov Hill. He was dressed in a military
uniform––displayed as a soldier in the fight for communism.131 Gottwald’s physical body
became part of the monument and a symbol of the communist memory, intended to
overwhelm the legacy of Masaryk and the First Republic in general. The National
Monument on Vítkov already had a memorial to Red soldiers, erasing the military heroes
of the First Republic. Now, a Czech communist leader had found his final resting place in
the monument, where Masaryk’s body had been intended to go, no less. The National
Monument was fully “communized.” By 1956, Gottwald’s body began to decay due to
improper embalming; eventually, no amount of prosthetics could hide the fact and the
corpse was removed. However, the monument retained its nature throughout the
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communist era as a lieu de mémoire of communist history, reminding the public of the
Red Army, of the Soviet liberation of Prague, of Gottwald’s leadership, and, as the KSČ
hoped, of everything but the First Republic.
The KSČ erased, delegitimized, and replaced historical symbols with the intention
to legitimize their own politics. In theory, removing physical symbols of a threatening
historical figure or event would de-emphasize them in historical memory. The reality was
not so simple. In the town of Prostějov, rioting and injury were reported after the removal
of a statue of Masaryk in 1953.132 Police had to guard Masaryk’s grave in Lány to
prevent undue commemoration every day until 1956.133 The mythology of the First
Republic was too strong to be replaced with Soviet mythology amongst the Czech public,
and their response to commemorative actions proved their loyalty to First Republic
narratives. Forgetting the Legionnaires and Masaryk did not legitimize the KSČ, it only
perpetuated the cycle of political deception and dishonesty that characterized the
communist era. Erasing evidence of First Republic heroes removed them from the
physical, but not the memory, landscape.
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CHAPTER III:
REWRITING LIVING MEMORY:
Concealing Political Instability in the ČSSR
“The Regimes of captive nations are embarrassed and confused and resort
to childish excuses to carry forward the iconoclastic campaign.”
- Radio Free Europe Report, 1954134
By the mid 1950s, it had become quite clear to the Czech population that
communism was a flawed and unstable system. The communist system had eliminated
many personal liberties, and any remnants of democracy were more performance than
anything else. Klement Gottwald, the first president of the ČSSR, worked under Joseph
Stalin’s direction to impose the Soviet model of communism upon Czechoslovakia,
resulting in political purges, land collectivization, and the violent show trials.135 These
events were destructive not only for Czechoslovakia’s political and economic situation,
but also harmed the Czech sense of self. Instead of building national pride, they created
distrust for the government and associations of poverty and political violence with the
Czechoslovak state.
The KSČ naturally did not want these negative impressions amongst their own
people, or on an international level. Thus, they continued manipulating historical
memory, but in a slightly different setting: instead of targeting symbols that had already
been established as components of the Czech national identity, they addressed the recent,
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communist past. In many cases, the KSČ was attempting to rewrite living memory.
Although living memory functions differently than centuries-old events in the theory of
historical memory, it is still part of a group’s interpretation of the past. Czech memories
of the show trials that had executed hundreds of innocent “enemies of the state” only a
few years prior, for example, were not surrounded in a mythology that had developed
over centuries. However, the tragic events of the early 1950s were powerful enough that
they were embedded and emotionally charged within a group memory, making them part
of historical memory.
When the KSČ crafted alternative narratives surrounding recent events of the
communist era, they participated in a type of nation-building, though not as literally as
during the First Republic. Czechoslovakia already existed as a nation, culturally and
politically. The KSČ’s goals were to alter the national identity, i.e. build an ideal
communist identity. They enacted what John Hutchinson calls cultural nationalism,
focusing on a “moral regeneration of the historical ‘community’ and attempting an inner
renovation of the ethnic base.”136 While this concept can apply to the KSČ’s more
general treatment of historical memory, it is especially relevant in examining the
regime’s recrafting of its own narrative. The reality of communist history in
Czechoslovakia––and around the Eastern Bloc––was often tragic, inconsistent, and
destructive. Regenerating and renovating the Czech historical memory surrounding these
events can be viewed as an attempt to change the Czech identity to be more inherently
communist, even in an era where communism was a politically unstable institution.
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The KSČ’s attempt to alter such recently formed historical memories was
somewhat absurd. Even if Czech remembrance of the recent past was not objective, the
population was not so forgetful that they accepted the KSČ’s justifications. Reremembering or ignoring certain events when they had occurred within living memory
was somewhat of a doomed project. The Czech public’s skepticism towards the
communist government’s acts of commemoration, or forgetting, was apparent in small
acts of dissidence, such as spreading negative rumors or refusing to attend statesponsored events. An examination of Czech literature of the era, such as the works of
prominent novelist Milan Kundera, further reveals the tension between the Czech
public’s memory and the KSČ’s attempts to forget. Although the KSČ’s re-remembrance
of its recent mistakes was performed with similar methodology to the alterations of older
Czech history, it utterly failed to penetrate the Czech consciousness on a cultural level.
Two attempts to rewrite the history of the ČSSR during the ČSSR are the
construction and demolition of Stalin monument in Prague and the celebration of
International Workers Day. Monuments and holidays are both examples of lieux de
mémoire, and the communist government intended these particular lieux to implement
communist values into the Czech national identity. The Stalin statue is a particularly
valuable example because its construction and its destruction are two different types of
altering historical memory. In attempt to build support for the communist celebration,
International Workers Day, on 1 May, communist politicians associated the date with
several other significant dates in the Czech past, making it a conglomeration of Czech
history in order to legitimize an unpopular holiday. Both of these cultural control tactics
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relied on building a system of historical symbols, as had been the case for the Bohemian
Reformation and the First Republic; however, this set of symbols had not previously been
a source of nationalism and “Czechness.” Using symbols that were not pillars of Czech
national identity meant that they were far less powerful to the Czech population.
However, the manipulation of historical memory formed in this era is vital to understand
because it shows the continuation of nation-building through historical memory beyond
the traditional appropriation of pre-ČSSR symbols. Attempting to alter recent, even
living, memory was proof of the political and cultural instability of the era, as communist
politicians scrambled to craft a positive narrative of the ČSSR.
The Kundera Paradigm and the Struggle Against Forgetting
“The struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting”
- Milan Kundera, 1979137
The works of Czech-born novelist Milan Kundera have become somewhat archetypal
representations of what it means to forget or remember during Czechoslovakia’s
communist regime. His 1979 novel, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting, is particularly
valuable in providing both an analysis of memory politics in the ČSSR and insight into
how the Czech population viewed the communist regime’s attempts to control their
identity by controlling their historical memory. Kundera’s fictional narratives interact
with Czech history and memory theory to create a story, sometimes symbolic, sometimes
literal, of what it meant to have one’s historical memory erased under communism.
Through his literary exploration of memory under communism, he revealed the instability
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and inconsistencies of the communist regime, as well as a cultural fixation on
remembering the past in a nation that seems determined to forget or misremember.
Milan Kundera was born in 1929 and lived in Czechoslovakia through the
German occupation and the first half of communist regime.138 He experienced the early
years of implementing communism, Stalinism, the 1968 Soviet invasion, and the early
stages of normalization––all of which appear in his writing. Kundera’s writing is highly
referential to the Czech history he experienced: particularly the history that the KSČ tried
to erase. In 1975, he went into voluntary exile in France, and became a naturalized
French citizen in 1981. This decision made him a controversial figure in Czech culture,
triggering a sense of abandonment or surrender during the peak of normalization. Even if
Kundera did abandon his nation, however, his novels are a non State-dictated
representation of Czech identity and memory during the ČSSR.
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting was originally published in France in 1979.
It is composed seven separate narratives, united thematically, but not by characters or
storyline. The book contains components of the magical realism genre, meaning it
portrays the contemporary world, with some mystical components.139 The themes within
The Book of Laughter and Forgetting embody what Richard Esbenshade calls “the
Kundera paradigm”: the “characterization of the relationship in Eastern Europe between
the state that erases and the memory that resists.”140 The Kundera paradigm consists of

138

Harold Segel, The Columbia Guide to the Literatures of Eastern Europe Since 1945 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2003), 318-19.
139
For more information on the literary genre magical realism, Ignacio López-Calvo, Magical Realism
(Critical Insights) (Ipswich, Massachusetts: Salem Press, 2004).
140
Richard S. Esbenshade, “Remembering to Forget: Memory, History, National Identity in Postwar EastCentral Europe,” Representations 49, (Winter 1995): 75.

72

two parts, which can be more generally applied to the communist politicization of
historical memory. First, there is state-sponsored forgetting of pieces of history that
undermine or contradict the communist political agenda. Then, there is the Czech
population’s acts of remembering as a site of cultural pushback. In the KSČ’s many
instances of altering historical memory, the Kundera paradigm most applies to the
government’s treatment of recent memory. The KSČ constantly either reframed or erased
recent political events that revealed the regime’s political instability; the Czech
population’s remembering of such events was “memory-as-resistance,” as Esbenshade
phrases it. A tension between the institutionalized amnesia and the civilian acts of
remembrance thus developed.
Kundera’s opening to The Book of Laughter and Forgetting immediately
establishes the lengths the KSČ went to alter less favorable aspects of their past. He
describes a 1948 photograph of Klement Gottwald on a balcony overlooking Old Town
Square, accompanied by Vladimír Clementis, the foreign minister at the time. Gottwald is
wearing a fur hat that Clementis had reportedly taken off his own head and generously
given to him. According to Kundera, the photo was copied hundreds of thousands of
times for propaganda, memorializing the moment across Czechoslovakia. Only four years
later, however, Clementis was tried during the show trials and executed. The propaganda
committee “immediately airbrushed him out of history and, obviously, out of all the
photographs as well. Ever since, Gottwald has stood on that balcony alone. Where
Clementis once stood, there is only bare palace wall. All that remains of Clementis is the
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cap of Gottwald’s head.”141 This introductory anecdote reveals not only how the KSČ
attempted total erasure of events that were very much alive in Czech memory, but also its
failure; Clementis’s hat lives on in the photograph as a signifier of who was truly on the
balcony. Theorist Svetlana Boym calls these “seams and erasures in the official history”
countermemory, pointing out how the disappearing fur hat signifies the larger
inconsistencies between the actual past and how people reconstruct and remember.142
Kundera often uses stories of individual forgetting, intentional and unintentional,
as a metaphor for the government’s institutional countermemory. In his chapter, Lost
Letters, the protagonist, Tamina, is obsessed with obtaining eleven diaries she left behind
when she illegally emigrated Czechoslovakia in 1969. Like the vast majority of
Kundera’s female characters, Tamina is a trope, often defined by her body and captured
through the male gaze.143 However, her story also relies on the politics of forgetting and
remembering under communism. “She is aware, of course, that there are many unpleasant
things in the notebooks––days of dissatisfaction, quarrels, even boredom,” Kundera
wrote. “But that is not what counts. She has no desire to turn the past into poetry, she
wants to give the past back its lost body.”144 Tamina, losing connection with her memory,
wants historical reality over “poetry.” In a metaphorical sense, Lost Letters discusses the
desire for realistic portrayals of history, even if they are unpleasant; considering the
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context, this can be read as a statement on the KSČ’s insistence on rewriting parts of the
past that were inconsistent with their desired reality.
Perhaps the most iconic quote from The Book of Laughter and Forgetting
addresses the political implications of forgetting. It is situated in the story of Mirek, a
man attempting to erase his memories of a past lover:
Mirek is as much a rewriter of history as the Communist Party, all political
parties, all nations, all men. People are always shouting they want to
create a better future. It’s not true. The future is an apathetic void of no
interest to anyone. The past is full of life, eager to irritate us, provoke and
insult us, tempt us to destroy or repaint it. They are fighting for access to
the laboratories where photographs are retouched and biographies and
histories re-written.145
Kundera clearly addresses the relationship between power and memory in this statement.
With far greater implications than Mirek’s love story, Kundera points out that real
political control lies in controlling the past. Like his claim from the same text, that “the
struggle of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting,” Kundera
focuses on the universalism of historical memory and political power.146 However, in
Czechoslovakia, the entanglement of the two is especially apparent. From the sheer
amount of memory manipulation, through political rhetoric, monuments, and tradition, to
the constant discussion about it in works such as Kundera’s own, memory politics are
constant in Czech history and culture. Although forgetting worked neither for Mirek nor
on an institutional level in the ČSSR, the Kundera paradigm helps describe the
connection between rewriting history and political agendas during the communist era.
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Demolishing the Cult of Stalin
In 1955, the KSČ built the largest monument to Joseph Stalin in the world, looking out
over Prague as though the dictator himself was surveying his land. Seven years later, it
was demolished, detonated until it was if it had never existed.147 The KSČ’s response to
the cult of Stalin through a monument demonstrated the rapid glorification then erasure
of a period of communist history that was still remembered by living generations.
Questions of how to implement adoration for an oppressive Soviet leader were faced by
the KSČ at the monument’s creation; the even bigger challenge, however, was how to
remove Stalin’s glorified place in constructed historical memory once the later Soviet
president Nikita Khrushchev denounced the former icon for crimes against humanity.
Communist politicians faced a crisis in memory politics as they struggled to recover from
building a monument only two years before its subject changed from a hero in the
communist identity to a criminal.
The cult of Stalin stemmed from Stalin’s attempts to appropriate Lenin’s
popularity after his own began to plummet in the era of collectivization and other failed
programs. Methods such as re-aligning communist philosophy with his own goals (and
persecuting theorists who interpreted Marxist philosophy differently) and commissioning
glorifying art to promote his image contributed to his program of self-aggrandization.148
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The cult extended beyond the Soviet Union to satellite states such as Czechoslovakia––
hence Prague’s monument of Stalin, which was a gift for his seventieth birthday.149
The proposed location of the monument, Letná Hill, was significant in its own
right. Geologists argued the hill could not support it and some architects argued it would
clash with the baroque skyline, though no one dared argue against its political
meaning.150 Others, such as Vlasta Štursová, one of the monument’s architects,
appreciated the ideological significance of the location over aesthetic issues. “The
political significance that government of the Czechoslovak Republic attributed to the
Stalin Memorial was already expressed by the chosen site,” she wrote. “The monument is
a pronounced architectural dominant, which marks out Letná from both close and distant
vantage points (from Vítkov, from Vinohrady), and is a sovereign element in the
panoramic pictures of the city.”151 Štursová’s statement reflected how, as historian Derek
Sayer phrased it, the monument was intended to occupy a space “squarely within the
emotional landscape of Czech history.”152 Not only did the monument make Stalin’s
political presence impossible to escape from virtually any point in Prague, but it
implemented a narrative of adoration for Stalin and the Soviet Union that did not truly
exist in Czech historical memory. The most massive monument of Stalin in the world
sent a message that contradicted Czechoslovakia’s ideals of the First Republic; even
when the KSČ was elected by the Czech population, the support for communism lacked

149

“Satellite states” refers to the nations that were officially independent, but under control of the Soviet
Union post World War II: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany.
150
Píchová, “The Lineup for Meat: The Stalin Statue in Prague,” 617.
151
Quoted in Derek Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1998) 273. Vítkov and Vinohrady are neighborhoods in Prague.
152
Sayer, The Coasts of Bohemia: A Czech History, 272-3.

77

the connection to the Soviet Union that the cult of Stalin demanded. The construction of
the statue demanded a change in Czech attitudes, beginning with commemoration on the
institutional level.
The monument was colossal, and so
many delays occurred that the final
unveiling

occurred

after

both

Stalin’s and Gottwald’s deaths. It
was

exorbitantly

expensive;

historians estimate the final cost was
280 million Czechoslovak crowns,
the equivalent of 4.5 million U.S.
dollars today. The final structure
featured Stalin with a book in his
left hand––presumably a work of
Marx and Engels––and his right

Figure 5

hand tucked into his coat in the
quintessential “leader” position, as popularized by Napoleon monuments (Figure 5).153
Behind him, two rows with three smaller figures represented Soviet people on the East
side and Czechoslovak on the West.154 All the figures except the back two looked
forward into the utopian future. The back two figures, a Czech and a Soviet soldier, gazed
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backwards in a defensive stance, ready to protect the Czech nation and the communist
ideology.
The inscription read, on the front “To our liberator, from the Czechoslovak
people," and was followed by "Now the age-old battle that the Czechoslovak nation
waged for its national existence, for its national independence, can be considered
complete" on the rear side.155 This inscription references the Soviet army’s liberation of
Prague at the end of the Second World War, though it disregards the shortly following
seizure of power. The monument is framed as Czech gratitude towards Stalin, but
actually embodies the intimidation and fear politics that were a reality in the statue’s
sheer size and the premise of its construction. The inscription built a narrative connecting
the sovereign Czech nation––a concept that had been so valued during the First
Republic––to the Soviet Union. This portrayal of the Czech-Soviet relationship was never
a symbol within Czech historical memory, but that did not stop the creators of the statue
from attempting to implement it through a lieu de mémoire.
The Czech population retained a sense of skepticism and even humor towards the
monument––the opposite of a shift in attitude towards the Soviet Union and their shared
history the KSČ had worked to build. According to a report about whisper campaigns
from the office of the minister of culture, Czechs joked that the streetcar station nearest to
Letná hill was actually called “Cult Station,” referencing how the monument blatantly
catered to the cult of Stalin.156 The line of figures in the monument even became
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commonly known as “fronta na maso,” or “the lineup for meat,” a dark reference to the
long lines for food and other goods due to shortages from Stalin’s failed economic
programs.157 Between Western media, Czech citizens, and their discourse through media
such as Radio Free Europe, a different type of mythology grew around the statue: one of
humor, rumor, and distain. The attempt to implement reverence for not only Stalin, but
the Soviet Union’s role in Czech history fell flat; although the monument watched over
the Czech public, their historical memory of Czech-Soviet relations remained unaltered.
In 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev halted any remnants of the cult of Stalin
with his “secret speech,” denouncing the deceased leader for his crimes and abuse of
power.158 The Eastern Bloc was suddenly littered with monuments of a violent dictator
instead of a revered icon––and Prague had the largest of them all. The monument had
never spread reverence for Stalin and the Soviet Union on the cultural level that the KSČ
had hoped, and the institutional decision to commemorate Stalin reflected badly on the
Party. The statue had to come down.
Of course, the true reasons for the Stalin monument’s destruction were too
embarrassing for KSČ to publicize. As an unnamed Polish emigrant reported to Radio
Free Europe,
The authorities claim that the work is being done because pedestal of the
statue was beginning to give way and the statue would fall if it were not
dismantled. No one in Prague believes this tale. The people laugh and say
that it is not the statue which is in danger of collapsing but the faith of the
Communists who have been hoodwinked and confused by the very people
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. This document is not a RFE report, but an
intercepted document by assistant to the minister of culture.
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who in the past licked the feet of the “Great Father of the People,”
knowing very well that he was an ordinary criminal and who now
unquestioningly obey the orders to spit on his tomb.159
There was a clear contradiction between the official attitudes towards the monument and
that of the Czech population, much like the initial reaction to the statue. Czechs were
quick to point out the hypocrisy of the KSČ, which remained composed of hardliners, but
still bowed to pressure of erasing Prague’s physical mark of devotion to Stalin.160 The
obvious lies were characteristic for Communist Parties of the Eastern Bloc, which were
infamous for their contradictions between statement and reality. Czech rumor and
speculation grew from the monument’s demolition as the KSČ insisted on an official
story that was clearly a reaction to the embarrassing dismantlement of the cult of Stalin a
few short years after the monument’s completion.
The statue’s demolition impacted the Czech culture, becoming a recognizable
reference. In 1965, Czech novelist Bohumil Hrabal published a short story titled The
Betrayal of Mirrors (Zrada Zrcadel) dedicated to the complex feelings of hope,
skepticism, and confusion that accompanied the removal of Stalin’s watchful eye. Hrabal
captured the first moment of the Stalin statue’s demolition: “the statue now stood
exposed, apparently stronger, more massive than ever, but tilted forward as though it
were about to crashing down on the city below.”161 The monument was revealed as both a
powerful part of Prague’s memory landscape, but also ephemeral, able to fall at any
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moment. Hrabal described the contrast of power and delicacy that the Stalin myth
embodied in the Czech landscape as the cult of Stalin was finally dissolved on an
institutional level, even though the cultural attitudes remained firmly separate from the
political intentions.
The monument of Stalin only existed for seven years, meaning any attempts to
erase it from historical memory involved denying memories of a living generation.
Unlike reframing the Bohemian Reformation, the KSČ’s implementation of the cult of
Stalin had no historical distance to be reframed or rewritten. The only solution was to
cover it–– what one Czech citizen reported in 1956 as a “clumsy bluff”––and move on to
the next phase of communist history.162 It is of course not so simple for an entire nation to
forget about fourteen thousand tons of granite representing a traumatic period of its
history. Letná remained, and remains, a lieu de mémoire of the Stalinist period. Even
today, many Czechs call the park at the top of the hill “Stalin,” or “U Stalina.” The
narratives that the KSČ tried to build were rejected from the Czech historical memory:
first, of the Soviet Union, particular Stalin, as the bringer of Czech nationhood, then the
complete denial of support for Stalin. These narratives were not drawn from the historical
foundation of Czech national identity, as was the case with Hus’s philosophy or
Masaryk’s legacy. The KSČ’s attempt to implement communism into the Czech identity
through the Stalin monument demonstrates not only the instability of the communist

162

"Jokes about Stalin Monument Attributed to RFE Inspiration." 5 July 1956. HU OSA 300-1-2-72097;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: General Records: Information Items; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.

82

narrative, but the failure to alter Czech national identity by building a historical memory
based on recent history.
Celebrating Communism and Czechness Every May
In the ČSSR, and communist states across the globe, the first of May was an important, if
contentious, tradition. Known as International Workers Day, or more informally May
Day, 1 May was the high point in the communist calendar, and celebrated the
international socialist movement as well as historical communist intellectuals and leaders.
State-sponsored (and often mandatory) parades with speeches by prominent communist
politicians marked the occasion. More specifically to the ČSSR, International Workers
Day was an opportunity to place Czechoslovakia on the international communist stage,
binding it with the domineering Soviet Union. However, International Workers Day, with
its focus on global communism, ties with the Soviet Union, and a lack of Czech historical
tradition, was not easily integrated into the systems of celebratory commemoration. In
attempt to legitimize International Workers Day in Czech historical memory and identity,
the KSČ created associations between International Workers Day and several other
Czech historical events in May: Czechoslovak Independence Day and the anniversary of
the Soviet liberation of Prague after World War II.
International Workers Day, Czechoslovak Independence Day, and “Liberation
Day” were inherently tied during the ČSSR, not only by chronological vicinity, but also
politically. Czechoslovak Independence Day, at the time, was on 5 May and Liberation
Day on the ninth. The influx of state-sponsored celebrations and national holidays was
evidence of the KSČ’s intent to implement communist values into the Czech national
83

identity. Holidays, as a way to unify a group by remembering the significance of a certain
day, are a crucial part of historical memory, and were adjusted accordingly by communist
regime. The way the KSČ celebrated the three holidays at the beginning of May
demonstrates their fixation on controlling the Czech cultural identity by commemorating
both the historic and recent past.
Like monuments, holidays serve to remind the public of some formative event or
concept. In the politics of controlling historical memory, a holiday can be a way to show
the public what should be remembered and celebrated. Similarly, preventing people from
celebrating a holiday is an attempt to erase parts of their history and memory.
Celebrations in the ČSSR embodied both practices, remembering and forgetting.
Czechoslovak Independence Day was originally on 28 October, established during the
First Republic in honor of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.163 During the
communist era, 5 May became the official holiday to celebrate Czechoslovak nationhood,
leaving 28 October, and memories of the First Republic, in the past. 5 May had more
recent historical significance for the Czechs; on that date in 1945, while Prague was still
occupied by German forces, Czech citizens rose up and formed a semi-successful
rebellion known as the Prague Uprising.164 More a wave of insurrections than an
organized revolt, the Prague Uprising blended into the Soviet army’s liberation of the
city. The uprising was, and is, a proud moment in Czech history; the younger generation
who did not experience the First Republic particularly appreciated it over 28 October.165
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The communist government, on the other hand, appreciated 5 May because it
connected Czech national pride to Soviet history, and was conveniently located four days
after International Workers Day. The transition from celebrating Czechoslovak
Independence Day on 28 October to 5 May fulfilled several communist political goals.
First, it helped create a new sense of national identity. The oppressor figure shifted from
the Austro-Hungarian Empire––a superpower that could be compared to the Soviet
Union––to the Nazis, who had been defeated by the Soviets in World War II. The enemy
figures in the creation myth shifted. Along those lines, when celebrating Czechoslovak
Independence on 5 May, the Soviets made a sudden appearance as positive figures. While
the Czechs themselves enacted the Prague Uprising, it was the Soviet Army who took the
final steps to liberate the city. In that historical moments, not only were Czechs and
Soviets on the same side, but the Soviets went down in history as the heroes. As one 1958
Czech radio report stated,
Czechs and Slovaks will celebrate their national day tomorrow, the 13th
anniversary of the day when units of the Soviet Army, enthusiastically
welcomed by the population, completed the liberation of the territory of
Czechoslovakia. The new People’s Democratic Czechoslovakia, whose
peoples suffered so long under the German fascist occupation, has since
then celebrated this day as a national holiday.166
This report emphasizes the positive relationship between the Czechs and Soviets––hence
the “enthusiastic” welcome––and the idea of Germans as a common enemy. It also
contrasts life under German fascism with life under communism, reminding Czech
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listeners not only of their liberation, but also the harshness of German occupation in order
to make 5 May (and the Soviets) seem as positive as possible.
Communist

officials

further

connected

the

Soviet

Union

to

Czech

commemorative holidays with Liberation Day, on 9 May. As much as the KSČ
emphasized the role of Soviets on Czechoslovak Independence Day, there was an entire
holiday only four days later dedicated to their role in the Second World War. Liberation
Day served to reinforce the narrative of the Soviet Union as a powerful but benevolent
military and political force, ignoring the oppressive power-dynamics that existed between
the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia at the time of celebration. Liberation Day also
demonstrated the shift from nationalism to internationalism. While Czechoslovak
Independence Day was devoted to commemorating the inception of the nation, and thus
building a national identity, Liberation Day celebrated the impact of the Soviet Union on
Czechoslovakia, attempting to solidify it in historical memory as a positive and beneficial
relationship.
International Workers Day embodied the themes that drove Czechoslovak
Independence Day and Liberation Day. During the International Workers Day
celebrations of 1958, Czech communist president Antonín Novotný declared, “Our May
Day rallies today are an expression of the firm resolve of the people of Czechoslovakia to
win final victory for socialism in our country in firm alliance with the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries.”167 Novotný glorified the Czechoslovak identity with his
statement of the people’s resolve and support, whether it was true or not, and then
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connected them to the other countries of the Eastern Bloc, emphasizing the international
aspect of communism. He went on to draw from historical emotions, stating “This year
we shall be commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Munich dictate which ushered in
an era of the worst humiliation and suffering for the Czech and Slovak nations [...] Prior
to these events, also, Germany was a member of the League of Nations and at that time,
too, she was receiving help from Western capitalist powers. The upshot of this policy was
fascism and war.” He concluded that, “The people of our republic have learned their
lesson from this bitter experience and forever safeguard their freedom and national and
political independence by means of their brotherly friendship, close alliance, and mutual
cooperation with the Soviet Union.”168 Similarly to the communist approach to
Czechoslovak Independence Day, Novotný discussed recent Czech history in terms of
Czech suffering and Soviet heroism. Czech history and how it was remembered was thus
used as a tool to garner support for the largely communist International Workers Day.
Despite the best attempts of politicians like Novotný, much of the Czech
population did not support the spirit of International Workers Day. In 1956, Radio Free
Europe produced on particularly memorable report titled “Prague Citizens Boo May Day
Fireworks”: “The public was indignant at the luxurious food offered to the ‘heroes of
work’ in Prague when they were decorated on May 1, 1956. The Prague population
showed its dislike of the fireworks by whistling.”169 Clearly, the rhetoric that tied
International Workers Day to the Czech past of liberation was poorly received. The KSČ
168

“Novotný Speech,” Daily report, Foreign radio broadcasts. 1 May 1958: HH4.
"Prague Citizens Boo May Day Fireworks", 6 July 1956. HU OSA 300-1-2-72758; Records of Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: General Records: Information Items; Open Society Archives
at Central European University, Budapest.
169

87

continued to take more dramatic measures than speeches and fireworks to make
International Workers Day part of the Czech system of lieux de mémoire. In 1952,
according to another Radio Free Europe Report, the government fined 307 Czech textile
workers for not attending May Day celebrations “despite oral and written orders they had
received.”170 Unlike other forms of commemoration that the KSČ had employed, they
could not enforce cultural participation in remembering the Soviet Army on 1 May.
In the words of Milan Kundera,
“There are all kinds of ghosts prowling these confused streets. They are
the ghosts of monuments demolished – demolished by the Czech
Reformation, demolished by the Austrian Counterreformation, demolished
by the Czechoslovak Republic, demolished by the Communists. Even
statues to Stalin have been torn down.”171
The “ghosts” of monuments, and even more so the political power dynamics they
represent, carry just as much weight as the monuments that were left standing. When the
KSČ removed the Stalin statue, the empty space where it had once towered over Prague
was just as meaningful as when the statue itself was there. Refusing to celebrate
Independence Day on 28 October says just as much as celebrating does. Kundera’s ghosts
are moments of the past that the KSČ, or any government, tried to forget, but could not
erase.
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EPILOGUE
In 1991, artist Vratislav Karel Novak erected a post-communist monument on
Letná Hill, on the site of the Stalin statue’s construction and demolition over thirty years
prior. The monument, titled the Pendulum of Time, is a massive metronome, a black
metal triangle with a slender red arm rhythmically moving back and forth, aided by an
internal mechanism (Figure 6).172 The Metronome expresses no direction towards the past
or future, or even a specificity of time in
the present. It is, as Svetlana Boym
describes, “as if the Metronome paces
the time of creativity, freed from any
ideological or didactic narratives.”173
Letná Park sat unoccupied for several
decades after the KSČ destroyed the
Stalin statue, and the trauma of Stalinism
was present even in an empty space as
the people of Prague struggled with how
to fill it.
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a device that marks the cadence of time without referencing history or the future. On a
hill that once held a statue intended to glorify a dictator that enacted destructive and cruel
policy within the Czechoslovakia, the twenty-five-meter-tall metronome only
acknowledges the past through bypassing it, as well as notions of memory and trauma
altogether.
The postcommunist era in Eastern and Central Europe presents new challenges
and questions regarding how to remember the past and how these memories create an
identity for the new, democratic era. When communism fell in Czechoslovakia, in the
1989 Velvet Revolution, the new government had high hopes for a fresh start with a
Czech identity based in democracy, liberty, and a unified people. Unfortunately, change
came slowly on a societal level. As Vaclav Havel, the first president of the new
democratic Czechoslovakia, remarked on the one-year anniversary of the Velvet
Revolution: “The social changes which seemed to us even a few months ago to be within
reach are taking place slowly and with difficulty. Disquiet, dissatisfaction, intolerance
and disappointment, accompanied by increasing spitefulness, are growing among the
people.”175 Ignoring the communist past, whether through a monument or a refusal to
discuss, did not allow for social progression. While the KSČ faced a historical memory
that often contradicted and had the potential to delegitimize its political agenda, the
contemporary Czech government faces the need to reconcile the communist past with the
new democratic political system and identity. Addressing national past trauma, recent or
ancient, can be difficult on an institutional level, and polarizing to the population.
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Although the dramatic and oppressive methods of cultural control in the ČSSR did not
exist in Post-Revolution Czechoslovakia, historical memory was and is still a political
issue.
Examining the role of historical memory in the mid twentieth century informs the
broader significance of historical memory in Czech culture. In the First Republic,
memory served as a tool in the politics of nation-building as Czechoslovakia developed
an identity as a formal nation. During the ČSSR, communist politicians attempted to
control historical memory, through commemorations or erasure, to create a more
communist Czech culture. In the postcommunist era, questions of the role of memory in
politics and national identity continue to arise. How should the post-Velvet Revolution
government approach the remnants of communist commemorations or monuments? What
parts of Czech history, communist and otherwise, should be commemorated in the new
era? Finally, how should the communist era be remembered and commemorated in order
to address the trauma, but continue to build a democratic national identity?
These questions remain unanswered in many ways, as Czechia is still
experiencing the ramifications of the communist era. On one hand, present
commemorations of the communist era are relatively subtle, both physically and
symbolically. The Metronome does not interact with Letná Park’s history with the Stalin
statue; it addresses the concept of time in the present, but not past trauma. Another
potential lieu de memoire, The Museum of Communism, is the only museum in Prague
devoted to the region’s communist past. It was opened not by Czechs, but by an
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American immigrant, and is primarily marketed as a tourist attraction.176 This site of
memory, though a record of the communist past, commodifies it from a non-Czech
perspective, removing any significance as a product of Czech national identity. The
Memorial to Victims of Communism, a series of sculptures intended to commemorate the
lives lost and affected during the communist era, is located on a walking path at the base
of Petřín Hill, a popular path for tourists, but outside of the city center. This location
means that the majority of those who see it are non-Czechs and passersby, for whom the
commemoration holds less power.177 Additionally, the place cards at the memorial are in
Czech, meaning many of the viewers are unable to tell even what the monument
commemorates. All of these sites of memory are connected to historical memory of the
communist past, but fail to directly address it.
Even as many commemorations seem to reject remembrance of the communist
past, this is not the only type of postcommunist remembrance in the region. Seemingly
contradictory, but still powerful, is nostalgia for the communist era (often called ostalgie
in the context of East Germany). It is an attempt to deal with the communist past, like the
commemorations and sites of memory above, but instead of avoiding direct
remembrance, nostalgia reconstructs the era more favorably. In the late 1990s and early
2000s, communist-era material and media artifacts began appearing in Czech popular
cultural. Re-screening old films or television shows, selling memorabilia, and wearing
fashion styles from the era are all examples of this nostalgia. Nostalgia for the communist
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era is not precisely a desire to reinstate communism; it is what theorist Irena Reifová calls
a desire for continuity.178 As political, economic, and social circumstances shifted post
Velvet Revolution, sometimes in disappointing directions, a wish for stability created an
imagined version of the communist past, which manifested in cultural symbols. Nostalgia
is no more an accurate picture of history than the version the KSČ crafted; 1990s and
twenty first century nostalgia for the communist past is just as much a symptom of the
tension between the trauma of the communist era and the new democratic era as failures
to commemorate it.
Milan Kundera calls Prague “a city without memory.”179 Prague does not actually
lack memory; it simply cannot face it. Throughout Czech history, a major part of the
Czech identity is based in the past, in cycles of remembering victory and glory while
forgetting defeat. The communists could not face the undermining reality of the First
Republic, so they rewrote it. The postcommunist government does not know how to
commemorate the communist era without challenging the new democracy, so they
neglect it. Contradictions are abundant in the politics of commemorating and forgetting
moments of the past as the Czech population has built a national identity around a
malleable, changing historical memory.
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